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LOSING THE FOREST AMONG THE TREES IN
THE FESTO SAGA-RATIONALIZING THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS AND
PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL IN VIEW OF
THE HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PATENT
PROTECTION
Ryan Thomas Grace*
Two inventors make the exact same discovery at the exact same time. The two
inventors, unknown to each other, draft two separate patent applications and use
the exact same language to describe and claim their respective inventions. If the
two patent applications could become patents, they could be construed as
encompassing completey dfferent inventions.
"and [Akce] wajust in time to see [the Rabbit] pop down a large rabbit-hok
under the hedge.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of patent protection can be found as early as 720 B.C. in a Greek
colony in southern Italy.2 These early patents were considered rewards, and they
protected luxury items such as recipes for food Hundreds of years later when
the idea of patent protection reached England, the Crown used patent awards as
a means to entice entrepreneurs to travel outside the country and bring back
* Ryan Thomas Grace holds a B.S.C.E. from University of Nebraska-Lincoln and aJ.D. from
Creighton University. He is a practicing patent attorney and inventor in the Omaha, Nebraska area.
The author wishes to thank Ellen Colyer, Irene Grace, and Ted Grace for their insight and support
during the preparation of this Article. The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author
and are not necessarily those of the aforementioned individuals. The author may be contacted via
electronic mail at gracesquire2003@yahoo.com.
I LEWIs CARROLL, Aket's Adwntums in Wonderlnd, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF LEWIS
CARROLL 16 (1994). Lewis Carroll was not only a famous author but also a famous mathematics
professor. The writings of Lewis Carroll have been unsurpassed by other authors in explaining the
mind-boggling disasters that can occur with the written word and faulty logic. Insofar as the written
word is the very essence of patent law, Lewis Carroll's works have been a great inspiration on this
field of law.
2 Sergenera45'GREGORYA. STOBBS,SOFTWAREPATENTS 3-4 (2d ed. 2000); DONALDS. CHISUM
ET AL, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAw CASES AND MATERIALS 6-7 (2d ed. 2001).
CHISUM ET AL., spra note 2, at 6-7.
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goods.4 The entrepreneurs were given patent awards that covered the new goods
that they brought back to England.' By the 1500s, the Crown began abusing its
power and granting patents to friends and family of the Crown.6 This, in turn,
drove the price of many goods upward and caused piracy along with a distrust in
the system.7
Unsurprisingly, the American patent system was largely influenced by the
problems with the monopolistic English patent custom and the abusive discretion
of the Crown." In recognition of these problems, the drafters of the Constitution
drafted the Patent Clause in a manner that would account for suppressive
monopolies and piracy.' The Patent Clause of the United States Constitution
provides in whole that Congress shall have the power to "promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."'
Around the time that England was having problems with its patent system and
America was drafting the Patent Clause, several justifications arose to explain the
benefits for protecting ideas. Under economic theory, patent protection provides
an incentive to invent, disclose, commercialize, and design around." In light of
deontological theory, an inventor has a right to his or her creation regardless of
the social consequences to society.' Moreover, under utilitarian theory, patent
protection attempts to provide the greatest good to society. 3
In drafting the Patent Act of 1790, the drafters considered these justifications
and the piracy problems in England's system. 4 Keeping these problems in mind,
the original Patent Act has evolved through various revisions into the Patent Act
' P.J. Fedrico, Origin and Earl Histoy of Patentr, 11J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 292-93
(1929).
Sd
6 STOBBS, supra note 2, at 3-4.
7 Id
' Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 462
(1966).
9 Id at 5-6.
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, dl. 8.
t CHISUM ETAL., supra note 2, at 70 (citations omitted).
12 Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intelkctal Propetty, 77 GEo. L.J. 287, 296-330 (1988).
13 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
§ 7 p. 13 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart, eds. 1970), a.ailabk at http://www.econlib.org/librafy/
Bentham/bnthPML0.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
14 Seegeneraly MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 9-17
(1998). Seeakro Graham, 383 U.S. at 6-7. Even though England is an important source of our current
patent culture, the United States Patent laws arise from an abundant, multicultural past that should
not be assigned to a single country. Venetian and French systems have also had a large impact on
our current system. For purposes of this Article, however, the problems with English patent custom
are most significant.
[Vol. 11:275
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of 1952. Under the current Patent Act, an inventor must file an application so
that the public may gain the knowledge of the invention." The application for the
invention must contain a set of claims, which delineate in precise terminology the
exact boundaries of the invention.
The current Patent Act also constrains inventors in several ways. Inventors
are limited to "any useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."16 The present Patent Act
requires that the invention be novel and that the disclosure of the invention be
sufficient to allow a person of ordinary skill to make or use the invention." Also,
the current Patent Act does not allow patent protection for obvious variations of
prior art. The Patent Act states that a patent for an invention may not be
obtained "if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and
the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
"s John W. Schlicher, The Law, Htog, and Pokfy of Prsecution History Estoppelin Patent Actions in
the U.S. Supreme Couxrtd-Ixptkationu of Festo (Part I), 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 581,584
(Aug. 2002). A patent application must contain a written description with one or more claims,
drawings if necessary to understand the invention, and an oath or declaration from the inventor. See
generat 383 C.F.R. § 1.51 (2002). The Patent and Trademark Office prefers that the patent
application contain the following. (1) a title; (2) cross-references to related inventions; (3) a
statement regarding federally-sponsored research; (4) a background to the invention; (5) a summary
of the invention; (6) a brief description of the drawings; (7) a detailed description of the invention;
(8) one or more claims to the invention; (9) an abstract of the disclosure; (10) drawings if necessary;
and (11) an oath or declaration. Id
16 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
17 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 35 U.S.C. § 102 provides in pertinent part as
follows:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or (b) the invention was patented
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use
or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application
for patent in the United States....
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 35 U.S.C. S 112 provides in pertinent part as follows:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, dear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. The
specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
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at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which the subject matter pertains."' 8
These disclosure requirements of the Constitution and the Patent Act have
had an effect on Supreme Court decisions regarding words in inventors'
disclosures. The requirements of the Patent Act have evolved to necessitate that
inventors point out and distinctly claim the subject matter that they regard as the
invention." Through this requirement, inventors use words in an attempt to
particularly point out their invention. In some situations, in order to counter the
inherent ambiguities of words, the Supreme Court has expanded literalism and
allowed protection for the equivalents of a word. This expansion has given
inventors a greater incentive to invest and disclose under the patent system
because their invention is more securely protected. In other situations, where
inventors attempt to resurrect conceded subject matter, the courts have correctly
held the inventor to the literal meaning of their words. In that situation, a strict
adherence to the meaning of a word supports the notice function of the patent
system and promotes competition by allowing competitors to design around
patents. In both of these situations, the courts are attempting to uphold the
intent of the Constitution. In the Festo saga2" that has haunted the patent
community for well over ten years, however, the United States Supreme Court
and the Federal Circuit have enlarged the expansive arms of prosecution history
estoppel. In doing so, the breath of the doctrine of equivalents has been reduced,
thereby causing a reduction in the incentives to invent and disclose under the
patent system. The result of this epic battle between the two doctrines flies in the
face of the historical justifications of our patent system.
First, this Article addresses the historical justifications for patent protection.21
In doing so, this Article examines economic,' deontological,' and utilitarian24
Is 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). Despite the meager wording of this rule, the nonobviousness
requirement of an invention is the patent attorney's playground because it is so subjective. The rule
first requires a patent attorney to determine a fictional person of ordinary skill in the art. Then the
attorney must go back to the time at which the invention was made. Next, the attorney must look
at all of the prior art available at that time and determine if the fictional person of ordinary skill
would have found it obvious to modify the prior art to make the invention.
19 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
2' Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558,56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Festo 1]; Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002) [hereinafter Fet ]; Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
[hereinafter Festo 11].
2See ifra notes 31-96 and accompanying text
" See infra notes 38-57 and accompanying text
See infra notes 58-80 and accompanying text
See infra notes 81-96 and accompanying text
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justifications for patent protection. Next, this Article discusses the historical
background underlying the justifications of the United States patent system.25 In
this regard, this Article sets forth the historical evolution of and problems with
England's patent custom.26 This Article continues by considering how England's
patent policy was instrumental in the development of America's patent system.27
This Article then addresses the evolution of the doctrine of equivalents and the
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel2l--specifically, how the result of the
Festo saga has increased the expansive arms of prosecution history estoppel and
reduced the scope of the doctrine of equivalents. Finally, this Article criticizes the
policy that has evolved from the Festo cases by examining the application of the
doctrine of equivalents and the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel in view
of the historical underpinnings and justifications for patent protection.2
Specifically, this Article analyzes the historical, economic, and philosophical
justifications for patent protection in order to show that the doctrine of
equivalents should not be confined by the arms of prosecution history estoppel.3°
II. THE HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PATENT PROTECTION
The notion of protecting ideas spans hundreds of years and crosses nearly all
westernized cultures.3 From this vast notion, several justifications for patent
protection have emerged. Two of the more traditional categories for justifying
patent protection include economic justifications and philosophical
justifications.32 The economic justifications are the more recent of the two
theories. This rationale takes into account the fact that most of the economic
growth in the United States can be explained by investments in research,
s See infra notes 97-193 and accompanying text
" See infra notes 98-135 and accompanying text
2 See infra notes 136-93 and accompanying text.
s See infra notes 194-386 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 386-410 and accompanying text
3o See infra notes 386-410 and accompanying text.
31 See generail STOBBS, $wpra note 2, at 3-4.; CHISUM ET AL, spra note 2, at 6-7. One of the
earliest expressions of a patent system can be found in Sybaris, a Greek colony in southern Italy that
existed from 720 to 510 B.C. CHISUM r AL, sipra note 2, at 6-7. The Sybarites were known for
a carefree life of luxury. Id Accordingly, they enacted protection for many types of culinary delights.
Id A few centuries after the destruction of Sybaris, Aristotle addressed Hippodamus of Miletus, a
noted builder and contemporary of Pericles, who proposed that a law be enacted to give rewards to
all who contribute to the good of the state. Id Although prize rewards for aesthetic advances were
common in classical Greece, Aristotle reacted negatively to Hippodamus' assertion and argued that
such a law would lead to alterations in the constitution. Id
32 CHISUM ET AL, supra note 2, at 5.
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development, and education rather than increases in capital and labor.33 Under
this theory, patents are thought to maximize the economic benefit to the inventor
and to society.'
Notwithstanding the economic views of the patent system, the more
traditional views for patent protection stem from two philosophical justifications.
The first justification, known as deontological justification, suggests that one has
a natural or moral right to one's creations regardless of the social consequences
to society as a whole.3" The second justification, known as utilitarianism, posits
that a property right in one's ideas is necessary for the greatest benefit to society
as a whole.36  All three of these theories were instrumental throughout the
evolution of the current American patent system. 7
A. ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS
The most prominent and recent views on the justifications for patent
protection are derived from the capitalistic views of most westernized
economies.3" For example, the capitalistic structure of America is one of the most
important concepts responsible for setting the United States apart from the rest
of the world. This is evidenced by the large sums of money connected to
intellectual property.39 Billion-dollar licenses, million-dollar infringement verdicts,
and unprecedented sales figures are all attributed to patent protection.'
Simply stated, patent protection attempts to promote growth in the economy
as a whole so as to provide ultimately for society as a whole. In general, patent
protection attempts to increase the knowledge of society to help society evolve
and advance as times change. Patent protection also attempts to increase
individual wealth by giving an incentive for individuals to increase the pool of
knowledge and push society forward.
" Seegeneral Robert M. Solow, TecbnicalChage andAggrMate Prodiction Fmnction, 39 REV. ECON.
& STAT. 312, 320 (1957).
SCHISUM ET AL, .upra note 2, at 59.
s Id at 5.
36 Id
' See general#, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), repinted in
JEFFERSON WRITINGS 1291-92 (M. Peterson ed. 1984) [hereinafter Jefferson Letter]. Thomas
Jefferson discussed the theories of natural rights and utilitarianism in his letter. He concluded that
the economic and utilitarian ideas surrounding the Patent Clause were far more significant than the
natural rights theory.
38 CHISUM Er AL, smpra note 2, at 59 (citations omitted).
39 Id
4 Id
[Vol. 11:275
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The information related to the goals of patent protection is enormous,
spanning hundreds of years and crossing nearly every known culture.41 Four of
the more recognized economic theories justifying protection, however, are that
a uniform patent system will lead to (1) an incentive to invent; (2) an incentive to
disclose; (3) an incentive to commercialize; and (4) an incentive to design
around.4 2
First, patent protection gives an inventor an incentive to invent. 3 In general,
especially in American society, inventors expect a reward or an economic
incentive for disclosing their ideas. As opposed to socialism, which focuses on
the good of the many with government intervention, capitalism focuses more on
the good of the individual in hopes of bringing about the good of the many.
Accordingly, patent protection in a capitalistic market focuses on incentives to the
individual in hopes that a result of the incentives to individuals brings about a
good for society as a whole."
Patent protection gives an incentive to invent because it allows for a limited
monopoly for the inventor's discoveries.4" If this monopoly or security was not
given to inventors, competitors who have not shared in the costs of the invention
could pirate inventions.' If discoveries were appropriated, the costs of the goods
derived from these inventions would be driven downward.47 Initially, lower prices
would seem to benefit society as a whole; however, by tipping the scale toward
the consumer, the capitalistic balance is disturbed and benefits to society as well
as to inventors would be lost. In particular, the lower prices would cause
inventors to receive less return on the research and development of their
discoveries.48 As a result, inventors might not be able to gain sufficient social
value for their discoveries to offset the costs of making them.49 The high risk of
capitalistic expenditure would cause underinvestment in new technologies (e.g.,
Russia). Accordingly, investment in new technologies, which provide huge social
benefits to the general public, might never occur. Patent protection serves not
4" Seegeenral#ADELMAN ETAL, sztra note 14, at 9-17.
42 See genera Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Pracices and the Anti-Mnopoy Laws, 24 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soci' 85-106 (Feb. 1942).
' See general# Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents andthe Progess ofSence: Exdusiv Rights andExpenmental
Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1024-28 n.43 (1989).
" Seegeneral# Bentham, supra note 13, at ch. 1 § 3.
4s ADELMAN Er AL, supra note 14, at 34 (citations omitted).
Id (citations omitted). See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,
607 (1950) (stating that copying would deprive the inventor of the benefit of the invention, which
would then foster concealment rather than disclosure of invention and negate one of the primary
purposes of the patent system).
47 ADELMAN ET AL., smpra note 14, at 34.
4 Id
' Id at 34-35.
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only the individual but also society by keeping the returns on inventions above the
free market level, thereby ensuring that individual inventors have an incentive to
invent and improve society with their discoveries.
Patent protection also gives inventors an incentive to disclose their inventions
to the public." This theory has historically been popular in courts throughout the
world as a means of counterbalancing the grant of a monopoly to inventors.
51
The disclosure of a discovery is what inventors give to the public in exchange for
a limited monopoly on their inventions. Without monopoly protection, inventors
would likely keep their discoveries secret in order to reduce copying.52 This
secrecy would also lead to the duplication of work. 3 Inventors would be unaware
of the respective inventions of others; therefore, inventions would need to be
reinvented. A lack of disclosure would also be detrimental to society because
resources would be used to reinvent inventions. That reinvention would amount
to a waste of individual and public money as well as a waste of creative
knowledge. As a result, the growth of society as a whole would be stifled.
Along with the incentive to invent and the incentive to disclose, an incentive
to commercialize also exists when patent protection is given for discoveries.r
4
The incentive to commercialize theory deals with the capitalistic market as a
whole. The theory stems from the fact that other people are usually involved in
injecting discoveries into the market. Discoveries are made everyday, but
investment and money are needed to turn these discoveries into products that
reach consumers." Without investment, an individual's discovery will merely
remain an idea secured by a patent, and an inventor's ideas will not gain popularity
with the public. Thus, the general public will never gain the benefit of the
invention. Since patents are freely assignable, inventors may assign their ideas to
individuals who have the commercial power to materialize the inventors ideas.
This, in turn, benefits both inventors and the public by giving the
commercialization ability to the inventor and by putting the product in the
public's hands.
Another, albeit less appetizing, incentive for patent protection is the incentive
to design around the prior art. 6 At first blush, this incentive might seem unjust,
' See generul# Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 1028-29.
31 ADELMAN ET AL, smpra note 14, at 37 (citations omitted).
52 Id
"3 CHISUM ET AL, supra note 2, at 72.
5' See gmfra Rich, supra note 42, at 179.
ss See CHisuM ET AL, supra note 2, at 73 (stating that a patent system allows capitalists,
advertisers, sellers, and developers to make the appropriate investments to ensure that consumers
eventually receive the benefit of the inventor's commercial embodiment).
-6 Id at 75.
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wasteful, or redundant of prior invention.57 Giving an inventor an incentive to
design around the prior art, however, is not only beneficial to the inventor but
also to the pubic. The incentive reinforces the incentive to disclose by forcing
inventors to claim all that they can in their patents. This incentive also benefits
the public by allowing competitors to find improvements on old inventions. No
matter how small these improvements, the results can have extreme effects on the
economy and on the lifestyle of the public. The incentive to design around also
infuses capital into the economy in research and development, which ultimately
results in improved products reaching consumers. This incentive has a fine line,
however, because the less security given to an inventor (e.g., greater incentive to
design around), the less inventors will disclose discoveries through the patent
system. Instead, inventors will choose to keep ideas secret. This secrecy will
ultimately reduce the incentive to design around because no base discoveries to
design around will exist.
B. DEONTOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATIONS
Notwithstanding current economic justifications for patent protection, one of
the more traditional views on patent protection relates to deontological theory.5"
This theory has its roots in well over 350 years of history.5 9 John Locke
developed a natural rights theory of property in 1690 in his Two Treatires of
Government.' Then, as patent protection became more prevalent throughout the
world, Locke's views on property rights were utilized to explain patent
protection.61
According to Locke, an individual's right to property begins with the notion
that God gave the world to men in common.' This statement seems
counterintuitive in that an individual's tights topropet" stems from God giving all
property to men in common. Locke connected the gap between these two
propositions by theorizing that every individual has a property interest in his or
her own body, as well as the work the body produces.' By mixing the labor of
an individual's body with the property in common conferred by God, an
5 Id
5 Id at 5.
9 John Locke, Second Trirati on CiMI Gowrnut, in Two TREATiSES oF GOVERNMENT
(Prometheus Books 1986).
' Locke, supra note 59, at ch. 5, S 25.
61 Segewrahj'Hughes, supra note 12, at 296-97; Wendy Gordon,A Proip Rght in Se-Expriox:
Equaity and Indi kdsalisd in the Nattral Law of Itllaxal Ppv"y, 102 YALE LJ. 1533, 1540 (1993);
Lawrence C. Becker, Deoseing to Own IxntdkctalPropmt, 68 CHI.-KENTL REV. 609, 609 (1993).
6 Locke, supra note 59, S 25.
61 Id § 27.
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individual may exclude the common right of other individuals." Locke based this
theory on the presumption that God did not give the earth to individuals to
remain uncultivated and in common to all men.6" God gave labor as a means to
convert common property into personal property.
Locke also imposed two conditions on the maintenance of personal property.
Locke stated that individuals may only retain personal property if enough
property is left in common for others.' Locke also contended that individuals
may only hold personal property that will be utilized. Anything beyond this
amount belongs to the common.67 Even though Locke did not directly address
intellectual property in his treatises, Locke's principles have historically been
utilized to justify patent protection on discoveries."
Patent protection is justified under Lockean theory in light of three
propositions. The first proposition is that ideas require a person's labor.69 The
second proposition is that ideas originated in the common, which is not
significantly devalued by their removal from the common.7" Third is the
proposition that the conversion of ideas into personal property does not breach
the non-waste provision.
7 1
With regard to labor, it is intuitive that people work to produce ideas. The
value of these ideas depends solely upon an individual's mental work inasmuch
as no physical component exists to thinking.72 One theory of labor takes into
account Locke's view that labor is pain.7 3  This theory concludes that the
unpleasantness of labor should be rewarded with property because people must
be motivated to perform labor.74 Another labor theory concludes that people
should be rewarded for how much value they add to other people's lives
regardless of whether they are motivated by that type of reward.75
These two perceptions of labor are evidenced when an engineer designs a
coupling for a bridge, when Thomas Edison invented the light bulb, or when
Marie Curie discovered radiation. As the industrial and e-commerce revolutions
lId
65 Id 28.
Id §31.
4 Locke, spra note 59, § 31.
See, e.g., Hughes, spra note 12, at 296-97; Gordon, supra note 61, at 1540; Becker, spra note
61, at 609.
69 Hughes, spra note 12, at 300.
70 Id
71 Id
72 Id
" Id at 302. Under this theory, labor is thought of as an activity that individuals do not enjoy
but engage in because they must. Id
74 Hughes, sopra note 12, at 303.
1s Id at 305.
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have taken afoot, these ideas of labor have become more prevalent. In many
situations, large amounts of time, energy, and money are necessary to bring an
invention to light. In this regard, ideas and inventions are brought about through
labor.
Even though it may seem counterintuitive, ideas originate in the common that
God gave to men.76 That proposition seems counterintuitive because the very
nature of a novel idea is that others have not previously considered the novel idea.
Hence, one might believe that if an idea is in the common, then by definition, it
is not novel or new. Contrary to this rationale, the field of ideas bears a great
similarity to Locke's idea of a common." Locke's idea of a common includes the
principle that the common has sufficient quantity and quality so that one person's
extraction from the common does not prevent the next person from extracting
the same quantity and quality from the common. Locke did not state that the
common needed to be infinite.7 He merely implied that the common should be
practically inexhaustible.
In light of this theory, personal rights to ideas and inventions easily meet the
inexhaustible requirement of the common.79 An idea can be used by an unlimited
number of persons, and one person's use of an idea cannot deplete the common
in any sense because an idea is not quantitative. In this regard, the common field
of ideas is an expansive medium. Moreover, in view of Locke's non-waste
provision, it is inherent that one cannot waste an idea where the common field of
ideas is an expansive medium. 0 Accordingly, Lockean or deontological theory
justifies protection of novel ideas.
C. UTILITARIAN JUSTIFICATIONS
Historically, deontological justifications for patent protection have been a hard
sell for many legal scholars."' Indeed, the predominant justification for patent
protection has found its roots in utilitarianism. ThomasJefferson evidenced this
view in his 1813 letter to Isaac McPherson. 3 Jefferson stated that England's
76 Se id at 315.
7 Id Locke believed that the field of ideas expanded with use.
7' Hughes, sulpra note 12, at 315.
0 Id
"I SeeJefferson Letter, spra note 37, at 1291; CHISUM LrrAL, sura note 2,at 54 (stating that the
predominant justification for American intellectual property law has been, without question,
utilitarianism or consequentialism).
82 Jefferson Letter, supra note 37, at 1292.
Id at 1286-94.
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deontological views on patent protection were a matter of pretend." He
explained that nature made the idea itself the most exclusive type of property
because as long as the individual does not divulge the idea, it is not known."5
Once the idea is released, however, the receiver of the idea cannot remove the
idea from the mind.' In that regard, anyone who receives an idea receives the
whole of the idea.
In light of this view on ideas,Jefferson argued that ideas should "freely spread
from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man,
and improvement of his condition... ,,"" In conclusion, Jefferson argued:
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. Society
may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an
encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility,
but this may or may not be done, according to the will and
convenience of society, without claim or complaint from any body.
Accordingly, it is a fact, as far as I am informed, that England was,
until we copied her, the only country on earth which ever, by a
general law, gave a legal right to the exclusive use of an idea....
Considering the exclusive right to invention as given not of natural
right, but for the benefit of society, I know well the difficulty of
drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the
embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.88
Jeremy Bentham, an English philosopher, propounded many of the same
utilitarian theories whichJefferson so vigorously supported. Bentham condoned
deontological theory, stating that the theory "is simple nonsense: natural and
imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense-nonsense upon s tilts."89 As opposed
to natural rights, Bentham believed that the state should adopt policies that would
maximize the happiness of its community's members.9 Under this view, the
" Id at 1291.
Id
Id Jefferson believed that the whole of the idea was always received; the idea did not diminish
in value as it was passed along.
87id
u Jefferson Letter, sipra note 37, at 1291-92.
10 JEREMYBENTAM,ANARCHICALFALLACIES,WoRKsII 501 (Edinburgh: WilliamTait, 1843);
sFN abo CHISUM ETAL., swra note 2, at 53 (incorrectly citing this quotation as coming from JEREMY
BENTHAM,AN INTRODUCIONTOTHEPRINCIPLESOFMORLSANDLEGISLATION (J.H. Burns and
H.LA. Hart, eds.)).
" Id ch. 1, S3, at 12.
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measure of a government simply dealt with its ability to maximize the happiness
of the community.9
With regard to this theory of maximizing happiness, utilitarianism as a means
for justifying patent protection is evident. Utilitarian justification is a matter of
positive law enacted by society to benefit society. If patent protection (a right to
exclude) did not exist, incentives for inventors to push their ideas into society
would not be adequate. For example, if patent protection did not exist,
competitors could simply copy inventions.2 Inventors would have no incentive
to spend the vast amounts of money, time, and energy to develop their products.93
This, in turn, would stifle invention because it would be beneficial to wait for
others to spend the energy inventing and then merely copy their work. No one
would engage in new development or original thought.94 To avoid this disaster
to society, patent protection is imperative.9" Accordingly, under utilitarian theory,
granting property rights in inventive contributions maximizes the happiness of
community members.
The various justifications for patent protection may seem diametrically
opposed. Stated another way, one might believe that one justification is more
important or persuasive than another. Irrespective of the argument that can be
made for or against these justifications, however, a single premise underlies each
of them: promoting innovation.9 6 For example, under economic justifications,
inventors are given a capitalistic incentive to come up with new ideas. Under
deontological theory, innovation is promoted because inventors have the
incentive of a natural right to a discovery. In other words, inventors can exclude
others from their property. Utilitarianism promotes innovation because it
acknowledges that if society is to benefit from a discovery, inventors must have
protection from appropriation in order to instigate disclosure.
91 I S 7, at 13.
92 Hettinger, spra note 61, at 48; see a~roJeremy Waldron, FromAuthors to Copiers: IndiidualRights
and Sodal Vaues in IntelkealPropeny, 68 CHI.-KENT L REV. 842,854 (1993).
93 Hettinger, sutra note 61, at 48.
94 Id
95 Id
One might even argue that promoting innovation is one of the very bases for human
existence. Many religions promote mimicking one's life after God. French philosopher Rene
Descartes, father of modern Western philosophy, believed that in order to justify our existence, God
must exist and be all knowing and all good. RENE DESCARTES, SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL
WRITINGS 77-79 (John Cottingham et al. trans., Cambridge University Press 1999). Accordingly,
one way to become closer to God is to become more knowledgeable. Patent systems promoting
innovation and disclosure increase the pool of knowledge. A patent system that increases the pool
of knowledge, therefore, makes society as a whole closer to God, which is one of the fundamental
axioms of many religions.
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These justifications fail as inventors are pushed through political, public policy,
or economic reasons to keep inventions secret. Accordingly, in order to promote
economic growth, to increase the pool of knowledge, and to provide the greatest
benefit to society, the law ought to reflect these justifications by providing the
greatest protection to inventors in order to alleviate fears of piracy as a result of
disclosure.
III. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND UNDERLYING THE
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM
The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of histogy. Hitoy
must be apart of the study, because without it we cannot know the precise scope
of rules which it is our business to know. It is apart of the rational study,
because it is the first step toward an enlightened skeptism, that is, toward a
deiberate reconsideration of the worth of those rules."'
A. THE SEED OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM
The justifications for patent protection have influenced the development of
the current patent system of the United States. Throughout the development of
the U.S. patent system, the justifications have been given deference in order to
help fine-tune the system. Like most other laws and policies in the United States,
the U.S. patent system was influenced by English patent custom.98 This influence
came in two flavors. First, several aspects of the English system were desired
because they were well justified economically and philosophically. Second,
English patent custom gave the drafters of the Constitution a flavor of what they
did not want, namely suppressive monopolies and piracy.99
During the tenth century, industrial standards and commerce in general were
struggling in England. " This struggle was partially due to England's isolation and
the dangerous modes of importing and exporting goods."'1 In order to stimulate
the economy, the Crown established a reward system to encourage entrepreneurs
to travel outside the country and to bring back goods and knowledge that was
' Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
9g CHISUM ET AL, sipra note 2, at 15.
" Seegeneral# Graham v. John Deere of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6-7, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459,
463 (1966).
1Oo Fedrico, stopra note 4, at 292-93.
1ot STOBBS, sipra note 2, at 3-4. At this time in England, nautical voyages were cosdy and
dangerous. Many people risked their lives on under-funded voyages where travel conditions were
less than optimal.
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foreign to England. 2 In consideration for three voyages abroad, the Crown
agreed to grant the entrepreneur the title of "thane."' 3 That tide was the rank
directly above an ordinary freeman.)" Notwithstanding the dangers of these
voyages, this reward system caused an influx of goods and knowledge from
individuals concerned with upping their social status.'
05
Stemming from this reward system, trading became big business in England."06
By the 1300s, powerful trade guilds, which fed on the profits of their trade, gained
political clout in many towns and villages.'0 As these guilds worked their way
into town governments, they retained the exclusive right to trade within the town,
and as entrepreneurs became more powerful and sophisticated, the mere title of
thane was no longer an incentive to undertake dangerous voyages. Accordingly,
in 1326, the Crown established a new policy to encourage the development of
new arts in England.0 8 The Crown offered monopolies to the first individuals or
trade guilds willing to take the risk of importing new products." 9 The new
monopoly policy made common the term "letters patent.""0 At that time in
England, the Crown granted proclamations or "open letters" for monopolies,
which also were known as "letters patent." Hence, the mainstreaming of the term
"cpatent."
For nearly one hundred years, the Crown granted monopolies (letters patents)
on both products and inventions used abroad."' These patents were merely
pirated, however, from inventors in other countries." 2 For example, one of the
first monopolies for an invention (as opposed to a mere product) was granted to
'0 Fedrico, .rpra note 4, at 292-93.
103 STOBBS, spra note 2, at 3-4.
104 id
105 id
06 Fedrico, wpra note 4, at 292-93. The merchant and craft guilds were originally social and
religious dubs. By stocking up on monopolies, however, they eventually controlled nearly every
trade and branch of business,
10 Id
108 STOBBS, supra note 2, at 4. See also Fedrico, spra note 4, at 292-93.
109 Fedrico, impra note 4, at 292-93. This practice gave rise to the very lucrative cloth industry of
England. This was the first industry in England developed through this policy.
110 STOBBS, spra note 2, at 4. In its earliest context, the term patent was a form of monopoly.
The word monopoly has its birth from the Greek word mows (monos) and x&eto (polein) meaning
"alone" and "to sell." The term patent has its roots in the Latin term keraepatentes. CHISUM ET AL,
spra note 2, at 2.
..t STOBBS, sspra note 2, at 5. Interestingly, at this time, patents were not given for inventions.
Essentially, the Crown was granting patents for pirating inventions from other countries. The first
patent for an actual invention on something developed in England was not granted until 1565. It
took the Crown six years to approve this patent, and it was granted to an Italian who happened to
live in England. Id
112 Id
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John of Shiedame on a method of manufacturing salt."' John of Shiedame did
not invent the method; he merely brought the knowledge of the method back to
England."4 The ramifications of granting a monopoly on this simple method
were devastating and brought the dark side of England's patent system into focus.
Salt was a basic necessity to English life. After the monopoly was granted to
John of Shiedame, he had the power to price salt at any amount, which he did,
and salt prices in England increased nearly tenfold."- To rub salt into the wound,
Queen Elizabeth was known for giving very lucrative monopolies to her
friends." 6 The best example of her behavior is evidenced by her fondness of Sir
Walter Raleigh. As history suggests, one can only image the reason why the fifty-
year-old Queen was so fond of the tall, handsome, freethinking, twenty-year-old
Raleigh."' Within two years of their meeting, the Queen granted Raleigh a
lucrative monopoly on the export of woolen broadcloths (worth £3,500 per year
plus £1 per year licensing fee from every tavern)."
In light of the stifling effect the Queen's behavior had on the economy, the
House of Commons began to contest openly the Queen's grant of monopolies." 9
Between 1571 and 1601, the Queen and the House of Commons fought back and
forth over the Queen's habit of granting monopolies to her friends.' Eventually,
the Queen backed down, and she apologized before the House of Commons.'
The Queen then reformed her habits and revoked the most offensive
monopolies. 2 More importantly, she allowed the common-law courts to try the
113 Id
114 Id
Its Id at 6. The price of salt rose from sixteen pence a bushel to fourteen or fifteen shillings
(there are twelve pence in a shilling). Id
116 STOBBS, supra note 2, at 5.
"' Seegeeral4 ANNE SoMERSET, ELIZABETH 1336 (1991). How Sir Walter Raleigh captured the
Queen's attention is not exactly clear, but there are many assumptions. According to legend, Walter
Raleigh threw down his expensive cloak to cover a mud puddle so that the Queen would not have
to step in the puddle. Other theories indicate that Raleigh's mother was a relative of Elizabeth I's
former governess. Regardless of how they met, the Queen indicated that Raleigh's company was
quite stimulating.
118 STOBBS, supra note 2, at 7. Apparently, wine taverns used the broadcloths. CHISUM ET AL,
supra note 2, at 13 n.49.
119 FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
CONFLICTS IN AMERICAN PATENT HISTORY 14-15 (1972).
120 Id
12 STOBBS, supra note 2, at 8. The Queen stated "that my grants should be grievous to my
people, and oppressions to be privileged under colour of our patents, our kingly dignity shall not
suffer it, yea, when I heard it, I could give no rest to my thoughts till I had reformed it." Id
12 VAUGHAN, .$pra note 119, at 14-15.
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remaining monopolies to test whether they were valid or void." Hence, patent
litigation was born.'
24
The lesson that Queen Elizabeth learned about monopolies was not passed
along to her successor, King James I. When King James I took the throne in
1603, he merely gave lip service to the inherent problems with monopolies.
25
The King stated that all monopolies would be surrendered pending an
investigation as to their validity. 26 The King then formed a board to review the
monopolies, 127 but the board was comprised of individuals who owned the most
lucrative and controversial monopolies in England. 28 Needless to say, few of the
monopolies were invalidated, and the King continued to issue numerous illegal
patents to friends.
29
The King's behavior instigated a public outcry sparked by the widespread
piracy of the suppressing monopolies. 3 ' The members of the board were labeled
as crooks, and by 1624, both houses of Parliament passed the Statute of
Monopolies. 3 ' This statute became England's first patent statute. The Statute
of Monopolies swept away almost all of the most suppressive monopolies in
England,12 but certain exceptions were made. Patents could be granted for new
123 Id
' STOBBS, sApra note 2, at 8.
'25 Id at 10.
126 Id
121 Id
128 Id One of the individuals on the Board was Sir Francis Bacon. Sir Francis Bacon's story is
similar to that of Sir Walter Raleigh's. During Queen Elizabeth I's reign, Bacon received several
lucrative patents. When King James I took over the thrown, the King appointed Bacon to review
the validity of the monopolies in England. Interestingly, Bacon had several of the most controversial
and lucrative monopolies. Accordingly, if Bacon eliminated the validity of any patents, then his
patents would also need to be eliminated. During this time, the number of monopolies actually
increased. Seegeneral4 id at 10.
129 SToBBS, supra note 2, at 11.
130 Id
1 Id Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies reads:
[Bie it declared and enacted that any declaration before mentioned shall not
extend to any letters patent and grants of privilege for the term of fourteen years
under, hereafter to be made, of the sole working or making of any manner of
new manufactures within this realm, to the true and first inventor and inventors
of such manufacture, which others at the time of making such letters patent shall
not use, so as also they be not contrary to law, nor mischievous to the State, by
raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally
inconvenient; the said fourteen years to be accounted from the date of the first
letters patents, or grant of such privilege hereafter to be made....
Sir William Jarrett, English Patent System, 26J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 761, 761 (1944).
132 STOBBS, supra note 2, at 11.
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inventions for a limited number of years.' More importantly, the patent could
only be issued to the true and originalinventor." Notwithstanding these advances
in patents, the inventor still had to petition the Crown, and the issue of a patent
was entirely in the King's grace.'
s
B. THE STEMMING OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT CLAUSE
Unsurprisingly, the American patent system was influenced by piracy, the
problems with the monopolistic English patent custom, and the independence
brought on by the American Revolution.'36 Prior to the ratification of the
Constitution, a federal patent system did not exist. 37 Under the Articles of
Confederation, each state retained every power, jurisdiction, and right that was
not expressly delegated to the federal government. 38 Accordingly, the states
retained the power to issue patents. In fact, in 1777, when the Articles of
Confederation were drafted, the framers made no attempt to transfer this power
to the federal government.'39 During this period, state power was sufficient
because most development was predominantly agrarian and limited."
Nearly ten years later, in 1787, state patent granting reached its peak.'4' In
view of the increased industrialization of the states, the differences between the
individual states' patent systems became a glaring problem in a country stifled by
the burdens associated with managing its newfound freedom. The multiple
applications of competing inventors and the piracy of inventions between states
strongly indicated the need for a centralized parent system. 4 This problem
instigated notions that a uniform federal patent system should be provided for in
133 I d
134 Id
135 Id at 12.
"t CHISUM Elr AL, supra note 2, at 15 (stating that English patent custom and the American
Revolution influenced American patent practice); Graham v. John Deere of Kansas City, 383 U.S.
1, 5-6, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 463 (1966) (stating that the American patent system was written
against the backdrop of the monopolies and piracy behavior in England).
137 VAUGHAN, supra note 119, at 16-19.
138 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 16 n.62.
139 Id
140 Id at 15.
141 VAUGHAN, spra note 119, at 16-19. Before the Constitution, the state of South Carolina
enacted what appears to be a general patent act for all of the states. Id The clause read: "The
Inventors of useful machines shall have a like exclusive privilege of making or vending their
machines for the like term of 14 years, under the same privileges and restrictions hereby granted to,
and imposed on, authors of books." CHISUM ET AL, smpra note 2, at 15-16 n.60.
142 VAUGHAN, JJpra note 119, at 18.
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the Constitution.' From this sentiment, a small but significant class of
promoters and manufacturers emerged and voiced their opinions that the
economic stakes were considerably greater than in colonial times. 1" The
promoters' opinions then influenced the state legislators during the drafting of the
Constitution.
141
Initially, the first drafts of the Constitution focused not on specific national
powers but instead, on the structure of the national government.'" In that
regard, the delegates to the Convention first met in Philadelphia on May 15,1787,
and a draft of the Constitution lacking a Patent Clause was submitted on August
6, 1787.147 Given that the framers of the Constitution mainly focused on the
structure of the national government, discussion of the specific powers of the
national government, including Congress' power to grant patents, did not ensue
until late in the Convention.'"
Twelve days after the draft of the Constitution was submitted, Charles
Pinckney, followed by James Madison, submitted America's first general patent
provisions. 149 Charles Pinckney, a congressman from South Carolina, proposed
that the federal government should have the power to grant patents for useful
inventions, the power to secure to authors exclusive rights for a certain time, and
the power to establish public institutions, rewards, and immunities for the
promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades, and manufactures." On that same
day, James Madison submitted that Congress should have the power to secure to
literary authors their copyrights for a limited time and the power to encourage, by
premiums and provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and
discoveries.'
51
The Committee on Detail adopted the current language in the Constitution on
September 5, 1787, with unanimous support of the language.' The resulting
patent provision provides, in whole, that Congress shall have the power to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
"3 Id at 16 (citations omitted).
144 Seegenra4 CHISUM ETAL, saupra note 2, at 15-16.
145 I d
146 ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 17 (citations omitted).
'" CHISUM ET AL., smpra note 2, at 16 n.63.
148 ADELMAN ETAL., supra note 14, at 17.
149 CHISUM ETAL, mpra note 2, at 16 n.63.
"0 ADELMAN ET AL., s.ura note 14, at 17.
151 Id
152 Id Thomas Jefferson initially questioned the language of the Patent Clause because he
doubted that the benefits of even limited monopolies could outweigh the benefits of their complete
abolishment. Id at 17 n.66. Jefferson changed his stance, however, shortly after the 1790 Act was
passed. He stated that Congress' act of issuing patents on discoveries started a reaction of inventions
beyond his own conception. Id at 18 n.67.
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to Authors and Inventors exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."'' 3 Well after the Constitution was ratified, both houses of Congress
construed the construction of the Constitution as being two separate provisions
merged into one.' s' The first provision stimulates the progress of science by
giving authors exclusive rights to their writings.' The second provision of the
clause gives Congress the authority to stimulate the progress of useful arts by
giving inventors the exclusive rights to their discoveries.1s6 In part because of the
Convention's negative view on national participation in economic affairs (e.g., the
Crown's "participation" in England), the committee limited the incentives of the
Patent Clause to exclusive rights alone.' Stated another way, inventors are given
an incentive to invent because they can exclude others from pirating the
invention. Under the U.S. system, the government does not participate by giving
patents as a reward or honor.
C. THE CULTIVATION OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM THROUGH THE
PATENT ACT
Since the ratification of the Patent Clause, Congress has enacted several Patent
Acts to carry out the exchange of a complete disclosure for a limited monopoly
called for in the Patent Clause.' In some situations, this exchange has been
compared to contract law. Traditionally, this exchange is not thought of as a
balancing of the inventor's and the public's rights. Instead, this exchange is
looked at through equity to ensure that the inventor has fulfilled the policy
requirements that justify the system. Recently, the United States Supreme Court
has stated that the Patent Clause itself reflects a need to avoid suppressive
monopolies that stifle competition without any significant advance in the progress
of science and useful arts."5 9 This advance in the useful arts to which the Supreme
Court refers is realized by the disclosure of the invention to the public. In order
to justify this exchange, the current Patent Act provides the framework for
disclosing one's discovery in exchange for the right to exclude. Congress has
attempted to uphold the justifications for a patent system since the advent of the
Patent Act in 1790.
153 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, dl. 8.
114 H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong. (2d Sess. 4 1952); S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong. (2d Sess. 3
1952), reprinted i# 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2394.
"53 Id
IS6 Id
157 ADELMAN ET AL, suepra note 14, at 17.
158 See enra/4 CHIsUM ET AL, supra note 2, at 18-22.
159 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,143,9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1847,
1848 (1989).
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1. The Patent Act of 1790. President George Washington signed into law
America's first patent statute on April 10, 1790, and Thomas Jefferson assumed
primary administrative authority over this Act."W The Patent Act of 1790 was a
far cry from the patent system of today. In 1790 though, inventive forces were
a far cry from the minds that sparked the industrial and computer revolutions of
today. Accordingly, stringent requirements for examination were not needed in
1790. The Patent Act of 1790 did not even create a patent office, which would
later become a glaring necessity to the patent process. 16' The Patent Act of 1790
allowed for patent examination 16 by a patent board seated by the Secretary of
State Thomas Jefferson, the Secretary of War Henry Knox, and the Attorney
General Edmund Randolph. 6" Under this Act, only fifty-five patents issued
before the unworkability of the process and the problems with upholding the
exchange of the Patent Clause outweighed the burden of drafting a new Patent
Act.'" Notwithstanding the bleak resemblance to present day patent law, one of
the requirements of the Patent Act of 1790 that is still evident today is that
patents are allowed for discoveries which encompass "any useful art, manufacture,
engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known or
used. , 1
65
2. The Patent Act of 1793. Inasmuch as the Patent Act of 1790 became an
unbearable burden on the three-member composition of the patent board,
Congress passed the Patent Act of 1793 in an attempt to better justify the Patent
Clause.' 66 The Patent Act of 1793 strayed far from the intent of the Constitution
though. In particular, the Patent Act of 1793 eliminated the examination process,
160 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
... Seegenefa45 CHlSUM ETAL, sttjra note 2, at 18-19.
162 The Patent Act of 1790 incorporated several aspects of the common law; however, the
examination aspect of the Act was truly unique and truly American. Id at 18 n.70. The United
States was one of the leading countries to employ examination as a requirement for a patent Id For
example, England, the country where much of American patent law is derived, used a registration
system where a patent application was simply registered and never examined until a conflict arose.
Id
163 CHISUM Er AL, supra note 2, at 18. Thomas Jefferson was the biggest skeptic to the patent
system, but after taking a seat on the board, he was known to guard vigorously the intent of the
patent system. Id at 17, 18 n.70.
164 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 18 n.69.
165 Compare CHISUM ET AL, suipra note 2, at 18, Aitb 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (providing in whole
that "[wjhoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title").
166 CHIsUM ET AL, supra note 2, at 19.
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the patent board, and implemented a registration system very similar to the
registration system of England. 67
This move by Congress was a move to the polar opposite of the Patent Act
of 1790; "[t]he Act of 1793 went from the extreme of rigid examination to the
opposite extreme of no examination at all."' The chief problem associated with
a registration system that does not require examination is that the validity of a
patent is not determined until a dispute arises. Accordingly, an individual could
rely on an invalid patent until someone is willing to challenge it. In light of this
lack of examination, pirated and duplicative patents flooded the system, and the
exchange called for in the Constitution broke down because identifying the true
inventor and determining what was invented became difficult. 69 Therefore, forty-
three years later, Congress decided that the patent system set forth in the Patent
Act of 1793 diverged from the spirit of the Constitution.
3. The Patent Act of 1836. In 1836, Congress enacted another Patent Act,
which has been recognized as the beginning ofAmerica's present patent system.70
In some aspects, the Patent Act of 1836 reverted back to the same essence of the
Patent Act of 1790. The Patent Act of 1836 reintroduced the requirement that
a patent application be examined for novelty and utility so as to uphold the
exchange in the Patent Clause. 7 ' This move was in large response to the public
outcry over appropriated and overlapping patents, which convoluted an
individual's protected rights and reduced disclosure incentives. The Patent Act
of 1836 further changed the patent world by creating a Patent Office, which was
a separate but distinct bureau in the U.S. Department of State." 2
4. The Patent Act of 1870. Notwithstanding the workability and overall
acceptance of the Patent Act of 1836, the Act was revised again in 1870.173 The
Patent Act of 1870 was enacted in large response to the courts' increased
problems with defining exactly what constitutes the discovery disclosed in the
patent application. 74 The courts struggled with separating what was old and what
was new in patent applications. The Patent Act of 1870, therefore, placed greater
167 KENNETH W. DOBYNS, THE PATENT OFFICE PoNY-A HISTORY OF THE EARLY PATENT
OFFICE 35 (1994), availabk of http://www.nyoutbox.net/popch06.htm (last visited Apr. 16,2004).
168 Id
169 CHISUM ET AL, spra note 2, at 19 (citations omitted). The Patent Act of 1793 was not a
complete disaster. This Act laid the foundation for several bases of the present patent system,
including infringement defenses of "public use" and the "on sale bar." Id at 19 n.73. The Patent
Act of 1793 also set the foundation for the disclosure requirements with which patent attorneys are
so in tune today. Id
170 CHISUM ET AL., stpra note 2, at 20 (citations omitted).
171 Id.
172 Id. at 20-21.
173 Id at 21.
174 Seetgener4al RIDSDALE ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS 3 (1949).
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emphasis on the patent claims, which point out with specificity what the applicant
is attempting to encompass. Similar to a plot of land, Congress wanted the claims
to work as a fence separating the new from the old so the public would know
exactly what was being exchanged for the limited monopoly right.
For nearly sixty years after the implementation of the Patent Act of 1870, the
Supreme Court and the public embraced the patent system with open arms.175
The Supreme Court typically decided several patent cases every term, and the
decisions usually were in favor of upholding the patent.176 Then in 1930, the
Great Depression changed all aspects of America, and the United States Supreme
Court began to view patents with great skepticism.'
The Supreme Court, led by the efforts of Justices Douglas and Black, began
striking down patents due to concerns for the social costs of the monopolistic
flavor of patents.17' Furthermore, the Court began crafting rules to make
obtaining and enforcing a patent more difficult. For example, the Court
expanded the doctrine of patent misuse, 17 eliminated a useful method of drafting
patent claims (means plus function claims),"s increased the bar of conception
(requiring a flash of genius),18' and nearly did away with the patentability of
combinations of old elements (requiring synergism). 2
The Supreme Court's behavior led Justice Jackson, in one of his many
dissenting opinions, to state: "the only patent that is valid is one which this Court
has not been able to get its hands on.""' 3 Judge Learned Hand also expressed his
disdain regarding one of the Supreme Court's anti-patent decisions, stating that
"[the inventiveness test is] as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom
175 ADELMAN ET AL, smpra note 14, at 20.
176 Id
17 CHISUM ETAL., sura note 2, at 21.
178 Id
179 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 60 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 21 (1944).
180 Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 71 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 175 (1946).
Today, means plus function claiming is one of the most useful tools that a patent attorney has at his
or her disposal. 35 U.S.C. § 112 provides in part that
[ain element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step
for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or
acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
181 Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 51 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 272 (1941).
18 Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147,87 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303
(1950). For patentability, the synergism test required that the combination of old elements had to
equal more than the sum of its parts. Today, this requirement has been abolished.
'8 Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572, 80 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 32 (1949).
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as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts."'8' Needless to say, the
patent bar, inventors, and several prominent judges were not pleased with the
Supreme Court's social and political views toward patents. This prompted Judge
Giles Sutherland Rich, regarded as the founding father of the modern patent
system, to help draft the present Patent Act of 1952 in order to reinstate the
appropriate incentives for inventors.""5
5. The Patent Act of 1952. Through Judge Rich's efforts, the Patent Act of
1952 trumped several of the Supreme Court's anti-patent rulings. Insofar as the
Supreme Court's roadblocks were overcome, the criteria set forth in the Patent
Act of 1952, which must be satisfied to received successfully a patent on one's
discovery, are quite few."a The 1952 Patent Act requires that an inventor file an
application so that the patentability of an individual's discovery can be
ascertained.Y"7 That application for the discovery must contain a set of claims that
particularly and distinctly point out the individual's discovery. As stated by the
current Patent Act, discovery is defined as any "useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof." '188 Furthermore, the invention must be novel; the disclosure of the
invention must be adequately described to allow a person of ordinary skill to make
or use the invention; and the inventor must set forth the best mode of the
invention.'89 Also, a patent for an invention may not be obtained
28 Harries v. Air King Prod. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162, 86 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 57 (2d Cir. 1950).
"s CHISUM ET AL, supra note 2, at 22-23.
286 SCHLICHER, supra note 15, at 581, 584.
,87 Id at 584. A patent application must contain a written description with one or more claims,
drawings if necessary to understand the invention, and an oath or declaration from the inventor.
The Patent and Trademark Office prefers that the patent application contain the following. (1) a
title; (2) cross-references to related inventions; (3) a statement regarding federally-sponsored
research; (4) a background to the invention; (5) a summary of the invention; (6) a brief description
of the drawings; (7) a detailed description of the invention; (8) one or more claims to the invention;
(9) an abstract of the disclosure; (10) drawings if necessary; and (11) an oath or declaration. CHISUM
ET AL, supra note 2, at 94.
ISO 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
"8 35 U.S.C. 102 (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 35 U.S.C. § 102 provides in pertinent part as
follows:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or (b) the invention was patented
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use
or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application
for patent in the United States....
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 35 U.S.C. § 112 provides in pertinent part as follows:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
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if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter
pertains.'"
Along with the requirements of an individual's discovery, the United States
Patent and Trademark Office must examine an individual's patent application to
determine if the application adequately sets forth the individual's invention and
whether the invention distinguishes the prior art.'91 This is needed to determine
if the inventor's disclosure is an even trade for the limited monopoly rights. More
often than not, the Patent Office rejects several of the claims describing the
individual's invention. The inventor then has an opportunity to respond to the
rejection through argument or amendment of the claims in order to receive
allowance. This process continues until the application is ultimately abandoned,
or the application issues as a patent. If the application issues as a patent, the
patent itself, along with the prosecution hirtog, puts the world on notice of the
inventor's discovery.
The disclosure to the world is that which is exchanged for the exclusive rights
granted by the Patent Clause. The requirements and system of prosecution of the
1952 Patent Act were implemented to give weight to the inherent disclosure
requirement of the Patent Clause while promoting disclosure through the
system. 192 These requirements were also implemented to reinforce the exchange
required by the Patent Clause, namely, to give inventors exclusive rights for their
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. The
specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
19 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). Despite the meager wording of this rule, the nonobviousness
requirement of an invention is the patent attorney's playground because it is so subjective. The rule
first requires a patent attorney to determine a fictional person of ordinary skill in the art Then the
attorney must go back to the time at which the invention was made. The attorney must then look
at all of the prior art available at that time and determine if the fictional person of ordinary skill
would have found it obvious to modify the prior art to make the invention.
191 SCILIC-iER, smtra note 15, at 584.
'2 See CHISUM ET AL., -r note 2, at 21-21. The Patent Act of 1952 overruled several of the
Supreme Court's strict formalistic rulings decided in the 1940s.
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discoveries while promoting science by requiring inventors to point out and
distinctly claim their discoveries.193
These requirements also highlight how the Patent Act of 1952 attempts to
fortify and support the Patent Clause. As opposed to a single act comprising our
patent system, however, the Patent Clause, Patent Act, and the philosophical and
economic justifications are a homogeneous fluid that combine to uphold our
patent system. One of the main forces supporting the Patent Clause is the
prevention of piracy. The act of piracy is determined through analyzing the
patent's disclosure and claims. This disclosure takes place by defining the
invention with words. Words are subject to interpretation; yet, without these
words, a discovery would never be conveyed. Accordingly, the scope of the
words forming the claims is one of the most debated issues surrounding the
exchange required by the Patent Clause because the scope determines whether a
second-comer is infringing the claims of a patent or is outside the scope of the
claims.
IV. DISCLOSING AN INVENTION THROUGH THE WORDS OF A PATENT
CLAIM-THE AMBIGUITIES OF LANGUAGE
'Y'm glad thy've begun asking riddles-I believe I can guess that," [Alice]
added aloud
' Do you mean that you think you can find out the answer to it?" said the
March Hare.
',Exacty so, "said Alice.
'Thenyou should say whatyou mean, "the March Hare went on.
'T do, "Alice hastily replied 'at least--at least I mean what I say-that' the
same thin, you know."
'Not the same thing a bit!"said the Hatter.'94
In an ideal world, inventors and patent attorneys would say exactly what they
mean in patent applications. 9' Given the ambiguities of language and the need
for interpretation that arises in the English language, however, what one actually
means is not always ascertainable. In the words of Supreme Court Justice
Kennedy, "[t]hings are not made for the sake of words, but words for things.' 96
Further complicating this matter is the fact that a patent attorney can be his or her
193 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1847, 1850 (1989).
194 CARROLL, supra note 1, at 69.
19s CHISUM ET AL, supra note 2, at 836.
196 FeirtoH, 535 U.S. at 731 (citations omitted).
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own lexicographer. 97 Stated another way, a patent attorney can make up words
to describe an invention, and a patent attorney can make words mean something
other than their dictionary definitions. Ambiguities of language are also magnified
by imperfections inherent in many humans.9 These characteristics include poor
communication between the inventor and the patent attorney, a lack of
understanding of the inventor's discovery, and a poor comprehension of future
markets available for the discovery.' 99 In patent matters, the meaning of a word
can also depend on the luck of the draw from the examiner pool.' The meaning
of a word can change through prosecution depending on what an examiner
interprets a word to mean.2 °' This interpretation might be totally unknown to the
patentee or the prosecuting attorney.
202
As a result of the ambiguities of language, much of the patent litigation
instigated today turns on the meaning of words. The courts have struggled with
this problem since the advent of the patent system because a constitutional
conflict arises with ambiguities in the disclosure. The conflict, like most other
patent issues, arises between the inventor's grant of a limited monopoly in
exchange for a clear and enabling disclosure to the public. If the words of a
patent convolute the applicant's discovery, then the public does not get the
benefit or knowledge of the discovery. Furthermore, if patent protection
remained on a discovery with convoluted language, the inventor would receive a
monopoly benefit without providing the public with a full and enabling disclosure.
Notwithstanding the dear need to resolve any ambiguities in the language of
the claims, a complete adherence to the written word would also cause the patent
system to crumble.2 3 A strict and literal adherence to the words of the claims of
a patent application can invite subversion of patent protection.' If the words of
a patent application were ridged, an invention could be pirated by changing one
element of a discovery, where the changed element is merely an equivalent or
cosmetic change to a word. For example, a literal interpretation of the word
"nailed" might not encompass a structure that is "riveted." In some situations
though, the word "nailed" might be considered an equivalent to the word
"riveted." If rigidity of interpretation were implemented, then the value of the
monopoly right would be substantially reduced because copiers could merely
make a cosmetic change and avoid patent infringement. This, in turn, would
197 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2111 (8th ed. 2001).
198 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 836.
199 Id
Festo III, 344 F.3d at 1385 (Rader, J., concurring).
201 Id at 1385.
2W d
2m CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 874-75.
20 Id at 874.
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discourage inventors from disclosing their discoveries and cause inventors to keep
their inventions secret. As a result, society would not receive the benefit of the
invention; general economic incentives would be reduced; and the inventor's
rights to a discovery would dwindle.
In many situations, the considerations between a literal adherence to words
and an equivalents adherence to words comes down to whom is the master: the
inventor attempting to convey what he or she means or the literal meaning of
words. On one hand, inventors might mean what they say; this does not equate,
however, to the inventor saying exactly what he or she means. On the other
hand, words can mean many different things depending on the context. This
conflict in language was fully acknowledged by district court Judge Rya W. Zobel,
quoting, in the words of Lewis Carroll:
'When I use a word, "Humtry Dumpty said,... "it meansJust what I choose
it to mean-neither more nor less."
'The question is, "saidAle, "hetheryou can make words mean so many
dff ent things."
'The question is," said Humpty Dumpfy, "awhich is to be the master-that's
aL 205
Historically, the courts have struggled with whether the inventor's meaning or
the literal meaning of the word is master. The courts have attempted to resolve
this issue by letting both the word and the inventor be master at some juncture
in the prosecution. The courts, through two judicially created doctrines, namely
the doctrine of equivalents and the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel,
attempted to resolve this problem.
To allow some of an inventor's intentions to take afoot, the doctrine of
equivalents provides that where two devices do the same work in substantially the
same way to bring about the same result, they are the same even if they differ in
name, shape, or form.2' The doctrine of equivalents is a common law doctrine
that has its teeth in nearly 150 years of history. In Winans v. Denmead,°7 the Court
determined for the first time that an alleged infringer's octagonal and pyramidal
shaped railroad car infringed a patent that claimed the railroad car as cylindrical
s Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 641 F. Supp. 828,838 n.8, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 305,
312 (D. Mass. 1985), affd 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cit. 1986) (alteration in original) (quoting LEWIS
CARROLL, Auc's ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, 186
(1960)).
' Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,608,85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 328,
331 (1950).
56 U.S. 330 (1854) (stating that the essence of the doctrine is that a second-corner may not
practice fraud on the patent).
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and conical.20 8 The Court stated that the claims as reasonably interpreted only
required that the car be so near to a true circle to embody the patentee's mode of
operation and thereby attain the same kind of result as was reached by his
invention.W
These intentions to protect the inventor still ring true today; however, our
modern cases have added meat to the doctrine of equivalents. The Graver Tank
decision has been, until recently, the leading authority on the doctrine of
equivalents.2 1 Nearly fifty years later, in Wlarner-Jenkinron Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co.,2 ' the Court clarified its stance on the doctrine and reaffirmed its
views on its application; then, in Festo II,"' the United States Supreme Court
stated that it will not hear any further debate on the doctrine."'
As a trump to the doctrine of equivalents, the doctrine of prosecution history
estoppel precludes patent owners from obtaining a construction to the words of
their claims that would, in effect, resurrect surrendered subject matter. In other
words, courts make the literal meaning of the word master under the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel. In Warner-Jenkinson, the Court set forth the
requirements of prosecution history estoppel. Several years later in Festo II, the
Court reconsidered its prior views of prosecution history estoppel.21 4 Then, the
Federal Circuit weighed in on the Supreme Court's decision and helped expand
the arms of prosecution history estoppel and reduce the breadth of the doctrine
of equivalents.
21 s
These cases have considered the meaning of words through an analysis of the
doctrine of equivalents and the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel. In these
cases, the courts have attempted to look at the individual doctrines and piece
together a justifiable result. When viewed in light of the historical development
of the patent system, economic justifications for the system, and philosophical
justifications for the system, however, the protection of the inventor's incentive
to disclose is paramount.
Id at 343-44.
W9 Id
210 CHISUM ET AL, supra note 2, at 875.
211 520 U.S. 17,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (1997).
212 535 U.S. at 722.
2 520 U.S. at 25-27 (reaffirming Court's views on the doctrine of equivalents); Festo II, 535 U.S.
at 731-32 (stating that Court will no longer hear debate on the matter).
214 Festo II, 535 U.S. at 733.
21s Festo II, 344 F.3d at 1359; Lewis R. Clayton, The Latest Festo' Riaft NAT'L L.J., Dec. 22,
2003, at 19.
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A. BROADENING LITERALISM THROUGH THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
'lThings equal to the same tbing may not be equal to eaeh other and, by the
same token, thingsfor mostpurposes &fferent may sometimes be equivaknts. 216
1. The Graver Tank Court. In Graver Tank, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the district court, stating that the doctrine of equivalents applies if two
devices perform substantially the same function in substantially the same way to
obtain the same result.217 In Graver Tank, Linde Air Products Co. sued Lincoln
and two Graver companies for infringing one of Linde Air's patents. 218 The
patent pertained to a composition of flux for electrically welding a structure. 19
Essentially, the patent claimed a combination consisting of alkaline earth metal
silicate.'20 In use, Linde Air used magnesium silicate as one of the alkaline earth
metals that made up the composition."2 1 Graver then made a product
substantially similar to the composition described in Linde Air's patent, but
Graver substituted manganese silicate for the magnesium silicate used by Linde
Air.2 Manganese silicate is not an alkaline earth metal.
The district court heard a myriad of evidence regarding the similarity of
magnesium silicate and manganese silicate.' Several chemists testified as to the
similarity of the reactions between the two metals.'2 4 Evidence from metallurgists
indicated that the two metals were often found together. s Further testimony
established that for purposes of the Linde Air patent, manganese silicate could be
included as an alkaline earth metal.2 26 Various treatises in organic chemistry
corroborated the contentions of the chemists and engineers.
2 7
In light of the testimony from the engineers and scientists, the district court
stated that manganese silicate can be efficiently and effectively substituted for
magnesium silicate as a major constituent of the welding process. 28 The trial
court did not find that Graver's product literally infringed Linde Air's patent
216 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609.
217 Id at 608.
"1 Id at 606.
219 Id
220 Id at 610.
221 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 610.
22 Id
I Id at 610-11.
2 Id at 610.
22' See id at 610-11 (noting that metallurgists stated that alkaline earth metals are often found in
manganese ores in their natural state).
22 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 611.
227 Id
22 1d at 611-12.
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because Graver's product did not read on every element of Linde Air's patent."'
The district court did find, however, that Graver infringed Linde Air's patent
through the doctrine of equivalents.2" Graver appealed the decision of the
district court, and the circuit court upheld the district court's decision regarding
the doctrine of equivalents. On rehearing, the United States Supreme Court
addressed the sole issue of whether the doctrine of equivalents is a valid doctrine
to apply to the claims."'
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court by emphasizing
the importance of the doctrine of equivalents. 2 Justice Jackson, writing for the
majority, first addressed the need for the doctrine of equivalents in the patent
system." 3 Justice Jackson stated that when determining infringement, one must
first look to the words of the patent claims.234 If the accused device falls within
the fence of the claims, infringement exists, and the story is over. 35 If the
accused device falls outside the words of the claims, however, then it may still
infringe through the doctrine of equivalents3 6
Justice Jackson emphasized that a patent would be a hollow, useless thing if
courts allowed imitation that did not necessarily copy every literal detail.23 If this
was the case, a copier would be encouraged to make insubstantial changes that
would add nothing but would be sufficient to force the device outside the literal
interpretation of the claims."' Justice Jackson continued by recognizing that an
individual rarely pirates the exact structure of a device."s Instead, an individual
who seeks to pirate an invention usually makes minor changes to mask the
piracy.2" To allow those insignificant changes puts the "inventor at the mercy of
verbalism" where the word is master, and the inventor is a mere subordinate to
substance and form." This, in turn, would deprive the inventor of the benefits
of the invention and nurture concealment as opposed to disclosure of the
229 Id at 607, 610.
' Id at 607.
23' Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 605-06.
232 Id at 607, 612.
233 Id at 605, 607-08.
" Id at 607.
235 Id
2 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
237 Id
21Id
9 Id at 607.
240 Id Justice Jackson compared patent law to copyright law in this instance. He stated that
copiers rarely copy an entire book or a play; they frequently make minor changes to try to cover up
the copying of the literature. Id
241 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
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invention to the public.242 As a result, the exchange of disclosure for a monopoly
would not take place, and one of the primary purposes of the patent system
would be negated.
Justice Jackson explained that the doctrine of equivalents arose to protect
inventors and the patent system from crumbling in the wake ofverbalism. 243 This
idea originated over 150 years ago to stifle fraud.2' The doctrine of equivalents
was founded on the theory that "if two devices do the same work in substantially
the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same,
even though they differ in name, form, or shape.""24
As applied to Linde Air's patent, Justice Jackson looked to the facts and
deferred to the district court's findings. Justice Jackson acknowledged that the
trial lasted three weeks and that the district court judge visited laboratories, heard
hours of testimony, and viewed several videos.2' In light of the district court's
findings, Justice Jackson opined that it would be difficult for him to conceive of
a clearer case for applying the doctrine of equivalents."4 Accordingly, Justice
Jackson affirmed the district court's finding of infringement through the doctrine
of equivalents.2
2. The Warner-Jenkinson Court. Nearly fifty years later in Warner-Jenkinson, the
Court declined an invitation to put to death the doctrine of equivalents and
instead clarified the metes and bounds of the doctrine. 9 In Warner-Jenkinson,
Hilton Davis Chemical Company held a patent for purifying dyes by filtering the
dye through a porous membrane at a certain pressure and pH level. s° When the
patent application was submitted, the claims of the application did not specify a
specific pH level for the dye."s  During prosecution of the application, the
examiner rejected the claims of the Hilton Davis application based on the Booth
242 md
243 Id at 608.
24 Id (citations omitted).
' Id at 609.
2 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 611.
247 Id at 612.
2" Id This case also produced a dissent by Justice Black, in which Justice Douglas concurred.
As stated above, at this time, a large conflict existed in the Court about where the patent system
should be going. Justices Jackson, Black, and Douglas were enemies on this battlefield. Both
Justices Black and Douglas were opposed to the monopolistic flavor patents brought to the
economy. Justice Jackson viewed patents as a means to stimulate the economy and the growth of
the nation in the arts and sciences. Inasmuch as Justices Black and Douglas's opinions have not
stood the test of time, they are not discussed in this Article. Furthermore, any lurking ghosts from
Justices Black and Douglas's theories have been put to rest by the 1952 Patent Act.
249 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 21.
2 Id at 21-22.
25' Id at 32.
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patent."2 The Booth patent taught a similar filtration process, but the claims
specified that the process must take place at a pH level above 9.0.2-3 The
examiner argued that the claims of the Hilton Davis application were too broad
because they included dye with a pH level above 9.0.2' Accordingly, the Hilton
Davis application was amended to claim a pH level between 6.0 and 9.0.255 The
reason for including the lower limit of a pH of 6.0 was unclear to the Court.25 6
Warner-Jenkinson argued that the lower range was implemented because Hilton
Davis knew the dye foamed at a pH level lower than 6.0.217 Hilton Davis
explained that the process was tested successfully at a pH level of 2.2, but Hilton
Davis failed to give an explanation why the lower limit was included. 2" The
Court observed that putting the upper limit of a pH of 9.0 distinguished the
Booth Patent so the lower limit of a pH of 6.0 was unnecessary to get around the
examiner's rejection. 25
The Hilton Davis application eventually became a patent with the claims
reciting a pH level between 6.0 and 9.0. Not knowing of the Hilton Davis patent,
Warner-Jenkinson began commercial use of a filtration process similar to the
claims of Hilton Davis's patent except that the pH level was about 5 .0."2 Hilton
Davis then sued Warner-Jenkinson for infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.26' The district court found that Wamer-Jenkinson infringed under
the doctrine of equivalents. 262 Wamer-Jenkinson then appealed the decision to
the Circuit Court of the United States for the Federal Circuit.' A divided court
affirmed the district court decision. Five judges dissented through three separate
opinions because the judges could not agree on the metes and bounds of the
doctrine of equivalents. 26 The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari to resolve the confusion in the district courts and the Federal Circuit
over the doctrine of equivalents.265
The Court ultimately reversed and remanded the Federal Circuit's opinion in
order for the Federal Circuit to consider the facts in light of the Court's
252 Id
23 Id
2'Warr-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 32.
2Ss Id
256 Id at 33.
211 Id at 22 n.2.
25 Id
2W9 arner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33.
20 Id at 23.
"1 Id at 21.
262 Id.
2 Id at 17, 21.
1 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 23, 24.
2 Id at 24.
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discussion on the doctrine of equivalents.2s s Justice Thomas, writing for a
unanimous court, addressed the significance of the doctrine of equivalents in the
patent system. 2 67 The Court rejected Warner-Jenkinson's request to strike down
Graver Tank and the doctrine of equivalents. The Court acknowledged, however,
that the doctrine "has taken on a life of its own, unbound by the words of the
patent claims. 2 6 The Court stated that a broad application of the doctrine
conflicts with the disclosure requirements of the Constitution."9
Justice Thomas stated that when applying the doctrine of equivalents, one
should not look at the invention as a whole to see if equivalents exist as a
whole.27 This type of analysis could lead to a conclusion that expands the limits
of the words of the claims." The doctrine of equivalents analysis should refer
to the equivalents of the individual elements or parts of the invention and the
individual elements or parts of the accused product or device.272 In light of this
view, the Court concluded that it would not be enlarging the patent beyond the
scope of the claims as long as the Court did not go beyond the substitution of
elements." 3 Hence, the Court would not be circumventing the exchange required
by the Patent Clause.2
74
266 Id
267 Id at 17, 29.
6 Id at 28-29.
W arner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28-29.
270 Id at 29.
271 Id
272 I,(
273 Id
2" The doctrine of equivalents was also discussed in detail in Festa H, 535 U.S. at 722. The Court
in Festo II reaffirmed the Court's prior holdings as to the doctrine of equivalents in both Graver Tank
and Wanmer-Jenkinson. The Court continued by stating that this is now settled law and any further
contentions should go to Congress, not the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court
reasoned the importance of applying the doctrine of equivalents to words as follows:
An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series of
drawings. A verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought written to satisfy the
requirements of patent law. This conversion of machine to words allows for
unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled. Often the invention
is novel and words do not exist to describe it. The dictionary does not always
keep abreast of the inventor. It cannot. Things are not made for the sake of
words, but words for things ....
It is true that the doctrine of equivalents renders the scope of patents less
certain. It may be difficult to determine what is, or is not, an equivalent to a
particular element of an invention. If competitors cannot be certain about a
patent's extent, they may be deterred from engaging in legitimate manufactures
outside its limits, or they may invest by mistake in competing products that the
patent secures. In addition the uncertainty may lead to wasteful litigation
between competitors, suits that a rule of literalism might avoid. These concerns
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B. UPHOLDING LITERALISM THROUGH PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL
In addition to stressing the importance of the doctrine of equivalents, the
Court in Warner-Jenkinson emphasized that if the doctrine of equivalents was
applied loosely, then it would undermine the disclosure requirements of the
Patent Clause.27 The Court stated that an all elements approach must be applied
to the doctrine of equivalents." 6 In other words, there must be equivalents of
each element of the patent claim and not merely equivalents of the accused
subject matter as a whole.2 77
As many courts before Warner-Jenkinson have recognized, the doctrine of
equivalents may sometimes run afoul. Equivalents is a subjective question, and
therefore, opinions as to equivalents and the meaning of words vary between
individuals and judges. In order to instill an objective flavor into the construction
of claims, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel arose as one trump to the
doctrine of equivalents.
Essentially, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel precludes an inventor
from using the doctrine of equivalents to resurrect the meaning of a word
surrendered through amendment during the prosecution of the patent. 7 ' The
modem views of prosecution history estoppel were initially set forth in Warner-
Jenkinson. Then, several years later in Festo I, the Federal Circuit gave the doctrine
of prosecution history estoppel a broad scope in order to limit the reach of the
doctrine of equivalents. The Supreme Court proceeded to cut back the Federal
Circuit's attempts to stifle the doctrine of equivalents. In September 2003
though, the Federal Circuit gave prosecution history estoppel expansive arms,
which has substantially reduced the breadth of the doctrine of equivalents.
1. The Warner-Jenkinson Court. In Warner-Jenkinson, the Court adhered to the
historical view that prosecution history estoppel was tied to amendments made
to avoid the bounds of the prior art. 79 When an amendment is made to an
element or word of a claim, the inventor may not then argue in an infringement
suit that an alleged infringer infringes the amended element under the doctrine of
with the doctrine of equivalents, however, axe not new. Each time the Court has
considered the doctrine, it has acknowledged this uncertainty as the price of
ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation, and it has affirmed the
doctrine over dissents that urged a more certain rule.
Festo II, 535 U.S. at 731-32 (citations omitted).
27 CHISUM ET AL., .rpra note 2, at 911.
276 I d
277 Id
278 Id at 910.
2" Wlner-Jenkimon, 520 U.S. at 17, 30-31.
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equivalents."' The Court reasoned that the inventor conceded the structure or
meaning of the word to obtain patentability of the claim. If the doctrine of
equivalents was applied, the inventor might be able to regain structure or a
meaning that the inventor expressly conceded was not encompassed by the
patent.
The Warner-Jenkinson Court continued by rejecting the petitioner's views that
any amendment to the claims should be a complete bar to asserting the doctrine
of equivalents as to the amended element.28 ' The Court noted that amendments
are made for many different reasons, some of which have nothing to do with
patentability.' The Court emphasized that if the structure was not given up to
avoid the prior art, then no reason exists to preclude any equivalents to the
structure.283 Furthermore, the Court stated that where the reason for amending
a claim is unclear, the Court will assume that the amendment was made for
patentability reasons absent evidence to the contrary.2"
In view of the prosecution history of the Hilton Davis patentJustice Thomas
noted that the examiner objected to the claims of the patent due to the perceived
overlap with the Booth patent.ss The Booth patent revealed a filtration system
that operated at a pH above 9.0.'2 In response to the examiner's rejection, the
Hilton Davis patent was amended to recite a filtration system that operated
between a pH of 6.0 and 9.0.28' Justice Thomas noted that the parties were not
disputing that Hilton Davis included the upper limit of 9.0 to avoid the Booth
patent.288 In that regard, Hilton Davis was estopped from asserting the doctrine
of equivalents as to the upper limit of 9.0.289 Hilton Davis was allowed nothing
more than the literal interpretation of a pH of 9.0.290
The Court also noted that the reason for adding the lower limit of 6.0 was
entirely unclear because the prior art does not teach a pH of 6.0.21' On its face,
it seems that the lower limit of 6.0 was written into the patent for no reason at all.
280 Id at 30.
2a1 Id
282 Id at 31.
Id at 30-31.
2M4 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33.
2 Id at 32.
286 Id
27 Id at 32-33.
288 Id
289 See Warner-jenkinuon, 520 U.S. at 32-33 (noting that where an amendment to a patent
application is to avoid the prior art, the use of the doctrine of equivalents is not necessarily
precluded. Thus, because it is admitted that pH 9.0 was included specifically to avoid the prior art
in the Booth patent, the doctrine of equivalents may not be applied to pH 9.0.).
2%0 Id
291 Id at 32.
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Justice Thomas stated that the mere inclusion of the lower limit of 6.0 became a
material element of the claim, but this inclusion did not necessarily preclude the
application of the doctrine of equivalents. 92 If the lower limit of 6.0 was added
for patentability reasons, then the limit is read in its literal terms. 2 3 If the lower
limit of 6.0 was not added for patentability, however, then Hilton Davis might not
be precluded from arguing the equivalents of the lower limit.294 Justice Thomas
noted that Hilton Davis had provided no explanation on the record of why the
lower limit was implemented into the claim. 295 Justice Thomas stated that where
no reason is established, the court should make a rebuttable presumption that the
amendment was made for patentability reasons. 96
2. The Federal Circuit's Approach in Festo I. In Festo I, the Federal Circuit took
an approach contrary to the exchange required by the Patent Clause. Contrary to
Warner-Jenkinson, the Federal Circuit determined that prosecution history estoppel
applies if a claim is narrowed to obtain a patent regardless of whether the
amendment was made to avoid the prior art. 7 The Federal Circuit further stated
that all equivalents to the element are thereby surrendered.9 8
In Festo I, Festo Corp. sued Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.
("Shoketsu") for infringing two of Festo Corp.'s patents under the doctrine of
equivalents.2 " The subject matter of the two patents pertained to a piston-driven
device that relied on magnets to move objects in a conveying system.3m The
Court noted that the device has been implemented in everything from sewing
machines to the Thunder Mountain Ride at Disney World.3"1
The first patent on which the Festo Corp. relied was the Stoll patent. During
the prosecution of the Stoll patent, the examiner rejected the claims because the
examiner believed that a portion of the language used to describe the invention
was unclear.30 2 The examiner further rejected the claims because some of the
Mird
293 Id at 33.
2 Warner-Jenkiaon, 520 U.S. at 32.
2 Id at 33.
296 Id
29 Festo II, 535 U.S. at 722.
298 Id
'd at 729.
30 Id at 728.
301 Id
Festo II, 535 U.S. at 722. This type of rejection is quite common in patent prosecution.
Examiners frequently make this type of rejection when a word is misspelled or where a structure is
referred to before it is properly set forth. This type of rejection comes under 35 U.S.C. S 112, which
recites in pertinent part that "[tihe specification shall condude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as the invention."
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). Stated another way, rejections of this nature can be made when the examiner
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claims were improper multiple dependent claims.3"3 In response, the Stoll patent
was amended to clarify the language and eliminate the problems with dependency
of the claims.' ° The amendment was not submitted to circumvent the prior
art.
305
The Carroll patent was the other patent on which Festo Corp. relied for the
patent infingement suit. °6 The Carroll patent was amended so the claims
described a pair of one-way sealing rings to keep impurities out of the device.
7
The Carroll patent was further amended to recite that the shell of the device and
the sleeve were made of magnetizable material." Similar to the Stoll patent, none
of the amendments to the Carroll patent were made to avoid the prior art.'
Some time after, Festo Corp. began selling the device, and Shoketsu entered
the market and began selling a similar device.31" The Shoketsu device did not use
a pair of one-way sealing rings as claimed by the Stoll and Carroll patents; instead,
Shoketsu implemented a single two-way sealing ring.3 ' Moreover, the sleeve of
Shoketsu's device was made of a nonmagnetizable alloy. 2' Insofar as Shoketsu's
device did not fall within the literal boundaries of the Stoll and Carroll patents,
Festo Corp. sued Shoketsu under the doctrine of equivalents." 3 In view of the
prosecution history of the Stoll and Carroll patents, Shoketsu raised the defense
of prosecution history estoppel.
31 4
In addressing the issue of prosecution history estoppel, the Federal Circuit
acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court, in Warner-Jenkinson, focused
finds that the language of the claim is confusing.
I Festo f, 535 U.S. at 728. Rejections of this nature also find basis in 35 U.S.C. § 112. Even
though such a rejection is more difficult to explain succinctly, the code reads in pertinent part as
follows:
[a] claim in multiple dependent form shall contain a reference, in the alternative
only, to more than one claim previously set forth and then specify a further
limitation of the subject matter claimed. A multiple dependent claim shall not
serve as a basis for any other multiple dependent claim. A multiple dependent
claim shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the
particular claim in relation to which it is being considered.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
Festo II, 535 U.S. at 722.See ge=ralf id
Id at 728.
307 Id
302 Id
3 Festo H, 535 U.S. at 728.
"0 Id at 729.
311 Id
312 Id
313 Id at 726.
314 Festo LH, 535 U.S. at 726.
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estoppel on amendments made to elements to overcome the prior art."' The
Federal Circuit further stated that its own precedent had never articulated that
prosecution history estoppel should have sufficient breadth to create estoppel for
any amendment related to patentability.316
Notwithstanding these roadblocks, the Federal Circuit stated that prosecution
history estoppel arises from any amendment that narrows the claims to comply
with the Patent Act irrespective of the prior art.31 7 Even more controversially, the
Federal Circuit stated that when estoppel arises, it stands as a complete bar against
any claim of equivalents for the element that was amended."' Moreover, the
Federal Circuit stated that voluntary amendments, if they narrow the claims, bar
equivalents as to the amended elements.319 The court also stated that if a change
to the claim is made and not explained in the amendment, then the change shall
be completely barred from any equivalents.32 In the Federal Circuit's view, the
case-by-case approach recited in Warner-Jenkinson had become unworkable.
3 21
Thus, the Federal Ciruit believed that this bright line rule of estoppel would
provide more certainty in determining infringement cases.
In light of the Federal Circuit's liberal view on prosecution history estoppel,
the Federal Circuit decided that Festo Corp. was estopped from asserting that any
of the elements it changed in the claims were entitled to equivalents."z The
Federal Circuit noted that neither the Stoll patent nor the Carroll patent were
amended to distinguish the prior art. The court stated, however, that this was
irrelevant because the patents were amended to gain patentability of the claims.
3 2
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit limited the language of the patents to their literal
meaning.
3 24
3. The Supreme Court's Remandin Festo II. Festo Corp. appealed the Federal
Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Court
granted certiorari to address the Federal Circuit's expanded view of prosecution
history estoppel 321 Justice Kennedy, writing for a unanimous Court, emphasized
the delicate exchange required by the Constitution. 26 After citing the Patent
315 Id at 722.
316 Id
31? Festo I, 234 F.3d at 562.
318 Id at 569.
319 Id at 568.
m Id at 578.
321 Id at 565.
322 Festo 1, 234 F.3d at 569.
323 Id at 591.
324 Id
' Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 533 U.S. 915 (2001) (granting writ
of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
326 Festo H, 535 U.S. at 731.
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Clause, Justice Kennedy explained that monopoly rights are like real property
insofar as the boundary description must be clear.327 This clarity is essential to
promote science because it allows the inventor, as well as the public, to know
what is owned (or in the case of a competitor, what is not owned).328 This clarity
is necessary because the inventor wants to bring his monopoly rights to light, and
the public wants the benefit of the disclosure.
With regard to prosecution history estoppel, Justice Kennedy noted that
prosecution history estoppel ensures that the doctrine of equivalents remains tied
to its underlying purpose. Justice Kennedy reasoned as follows:
Where the original application once embraced the purported
equivalents but the patentee narrowed his claims to obtain the
patent or to protect its validity, the patentee cannot assert that he
lacked the words to describe the subject matter in question. The
doctrine of equivalents is premised on language's inability to capture
the essence of innovation, but a prior application describing the
precise element at issue undercuts that premise. In that instance the
prosecution history has established that the inventor turned his
attention to the subject matter in question, knew the words for both
the broader and the narrower, and affirmatively chose the latter.329
The Feslo II Court continued by agreeing with the Federal Circuit that a
narrowing amendment made to satisfy any requirement of the Patent Act may give
rise to an estoppel.33 The Court acknowledged, however, that estoppel is usually
tied to situations where the applicant made a change to obtain patentability.33 In
some cases, amendments are made with no intention of surrendering subject
matter. The Court set forth a few examples as follows:
There are some cases, however, where the amendment cannot
reasonably be viewed as surrendering a particular equivalent. The
equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time of the
application; the rationale underlying the amendment may bear no
more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question; or
there may be some other reason suggesting that the patentee could
not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial
327 Id
328 Id
329 Id at 734-35.
31 Id at 735.
I Festo II, 535 U.S. at 735.
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substitute in question. In those cases the patentee can overcome
the presumption that prosecution history estoppel bars a finding of
equivalence.3
3 2
Furthermore, when estoppel does arise, the breadth of estoppel requires an
examination of the subject matter that the applicant surrendered through the
amendment.33 By making an amendment, the applicant has conceded that the
amended claims do not reach as far as the original claim.- It does not follow,
however, that the amended claim is so perfect in its description that no one could
devise an equivalent. Language that replaces language is still imprecise.335 The
narrowed amendment may demonstrate what the claim is not but still fail to
capture precisely what the claim is.336 As a result, there is no more reason for
holding the application to the literal terms of an amended claim than there is for
abolishing the doctrine of equivalents altogether and holding every application to
the claims literal meaning.33' After the Court's reasoning, the Court vacated the
Federal Circuit's decision and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with
the Court's opinion. 38
4. The Federal Circuit's 2003 Dedsion in Festo III. Instead of simply deciding
the case, the Federal Circuit met en banc and reconsidered the entire realm of
prosecution history estoppel.3 The court first set forth the rule regarding
analysis under prosecution history estoppel.
1. The court stated that the first step in the inquiry is to decide if
the literal scope of the claim was narrowed through
amendment.30
a. If the scope was not narrowed through amendment, then
prosecution history estoppel does not apply."4
332 Id at 740-41.
33 Id at 741.
334 Id at 740.
335 Id
13 Festo II, 535 U.S. at 740.
337 Id at 740-41.
"I Id at 742.
39 Fasto III, 344 F.3d at 1359; jst also Clayton, st'ra note 215, at 19 (stating that the Federal
Circuit met en banc to consider the full scope of prosecution history estoppel).
34 Festo III, 344 F.3d 13 at 1366 (citing Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., 330 F.3d
1352, 1356,66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1859, 1863 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
341 Id
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b. If the scope was narrowed through amendment, then the
court must continue its inquiry by addressing a second
step.3
2
2. If the amendment was narrowing, then the court must
determine if the amendment was substantially related to
patentability."
a. If the prosecution history does not reveal whether the
amendment was substantially related to patentability, then a
substantially related reason is presumed subject to rebuttal;
if the rebuttal is successful then prosecution history estoppel
does not apply.'
i. Any evidence of rebuttal is limited to evidence
revealed in the prosecution record.4"
b. If the court finds a substantial reason related to
patentability, then the court is required to continue by
addressing a third step.'
3. Where a substantial reason related to patentability exists, the
court presumes that all equivalents of the subject matter were
surrendered subject to rebuttal.3 47
a. The presumption is rebutted where it can be
demonstrated that a particular equivalent was not
surrendered; in that case, prosecution history estoppel
does not apply.s
i. The court stated that the patentee might demonstrate
that the alleged equivalent would not have been
foreseeable when the narrowing amendment was
made."'
ii. The court stated that the patentee might show that
only a tangential relationship existed between the
342 Id
34' Id at 1367.
' Id (citations omitted). The court stated that it was reinstating its earlier opinion. Id
34s Festo III, 344 F.3d at 1367 (citing PioneerMagnetics and stating that only the prosecution history
record may be considered in determining whether a patentee has overcome the presumption, so as
not to undermine the public notice function served by the record).
34 Festo I1, 344 F.3d at 1367.
347 Id
50 Id
-ul Id at 1365.
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narrowing amendment and the equivalent in
question. °
iii. The court stated that the patentee might demonstrate
that some other reason exists that the patentee "could
not reasonably have been expected to have described
the alleged equivalent." ''
b. If the presumption is not successfully rebutted,
prosecution history estoppel applies and reliance on the
doctrine of equivalents is barred." 2
WAS THE AMENDMENT NARROWING?
E SUBSTANTIALLY RELATED TO PATE2ITABILrIY
WAS ALLEGED EQUIVALENT UNR)RSEEABLE WHEN AMENDED?
I' "I J-7-, 1
WAS RATIONALE OF AMENDMENT MERELY TANGENTIAL TO EQUIVALENT?
NO TYES
CTMIE REASONS EVIDENT FROM PROSEOJTON H-ISIRY?
| NO
ESIPE
350 Ia
31 Festo I1, 344 F.3d at 1368.
352 Id at 1367.
qI)
L--
NO I Y~
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With regard to rebutting the presumption of complete surrender, the court
acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court indicated that rebuttal exists
where the patentee shows that "at the time of the amendment one skilled in the
art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have
literally encompassed the alleged equivalent. 35 3  The Federal Circuit then
interpreted the Court's examples of ways to rebut the presumption as only
including (1) unforeseeability of the equivalent at the time of the amendment; (2)
a tangential relationship between the equivalent in question and the amendment;
and (3) other reasons suggesting that the alleged equivalent could not reasonably
have been described."s
The Federal Circuit limited the "unforeseeability" rebuttal to two different
categories.3 " The court stated that in most circumstances where an equivalent
portrays later-developed technology or technology not known in the relevant art,
then the equivalent would have been unforeseeable.3" These two categories
depend on factual issues such as the state of the art and the ordinary skill in the
art when the amendment was made.35s The court indicated that expert testimony
and extrinsic evidence is admissible in making this determination.
358
With regard to the "tangential relationship" category, the court stated that the
amendment cannot be directly relevant and must only be peripheral to the alleged
equivalent.35 9 Amendments made to avoid the prior art are central to the
allowance of the claim and are not considered tangential.' In determining if an
amendment was tangential, the court should only consider the prosecution history
of the amendment.361 In order to interpret the record, additional evidence should
not be considered outside of testimony from those skilled in the art.62
3s3 Id at 1365 (citations omitted).
351 Id; re also Clayton,.supra note 215, at 19 (stating that the Federal Circuit added its gloss on the
Supreme Court's decision by treating the examples of rebuttal as the only ways in which the
presumption can be rebutted).
3m Festo II, 344 F.3d at 1369.
316 Id The court gave the example of the transistor in relation to vacuum tubes, or Velcro® in
relation to fasteners.
357 Id
358 Id
39 I (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1385 (3d ed. 1997) (defining
"tangential" as "[mierely touching or slightly connected" or "[o]nly superficially relevant; divergent");
2 THE NEW SHORTER OXFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3215-16 (1993) (defining "tangential" as
"merely touch[ing] a subject or matter; peripheral")).
o Festo II1, 344 F.3d at 1369.
361 Id
M6 Id
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The court continued by narrowly defining the "other reasons" category for
rebuttal.3 63 The only example the court gave for this category is where a
shortcoming of language exists.364 The court stated that this category should also
be limited to evidence in the prosecution history. 6
Circuit Judge Randall R. Rader concurred with the majority's rule but wrote
separately to set forth the dangers of judicially creating such a detailed rule to an
exception to an exception of infringement.3" Judge Rader analogized that "[l]ike
the proverbial balloon, a pinch on this backside of the law disrupts symmetry on
the front side." s7 By pinching the doctrine of equivalents, the fundamental
practice of patent acquisition is changed.3 " Judge Rader opined that unintended
consequences arise from the court's stringent estoppel presumptions, in part,
because every examiner at the Patent and Trademark Office is different. 3 9 Some
examiners attempt to narrow the claims as much as possible and other examiners
are more lax.370 Therefore, Judge Rader reasoned that the application of
prosecution history estoppel depends largely on the luck of the draw in the
examiner pool.
3Y1
Judge Rader continued his analysis by criticizing the precedent of prosecution
history estoppel as moving at lightning speed. 2 Over the last ten years, the rules
regarding prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents have
changed several times. 3 The quick pace of the changes disrupts the notice
function of the patent daims.374
With exception added to exception, and presumptions rebutted by
still newer presumptions, a practitioner can scarcely predict the
scope of claims years in the future, when they are likely to be
u Id The court stated that this category is used not to totally foreclose the patentee.
Y Id
e Pste 11, 344 F.3d at 1370.
Id at 1372-77 (RaderJ., concurring).
37 Id at 1374.
3W Id
30 Id at 1376.
370 Feuto III, 344 F.3d at 1375.
371 Id The scope of estoppel also depends on the number of patent filings. As a result of
increased filings, explanations axe rarely given for amendments. According to United States Patent
and Trademark Office statistics, in 1950, about 67,000 applications were filed;in 1990, about 165,000
applications were filed; and in 2001, about 327,000 applications were filed. Id at 1375 n.2.
72 Id at 1376 (Rader, J., concurring).
373 Id
374 Id
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enforced, let alone the scope of claims drafted a few years ago when
amendments did not potentially forfeit claim scope.375
CircuitJudge Pauline Newman, joined by Chief Judge Haldane Robert Mayer,
concurred in part and dissented in part to the majority's opinion.3 76  In
emphasizing the importance of the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution
history estoppel, Judge Newman reasoned as follows:
Technology has come to dominate modem industry and culture,
and patent principles have evolved as a primary economic incentive
for innovation. Our strength as a nation is grounded in our
technologic leadership and entrepreneurial energy, and in our
competitive vigor. The proper balance among invention,
innovation and competition is a matter of national concern. The
doctrine of equivalents is part of that balance.
37 7
The judicially created doctrine of equivalents was created to stop imitators
from pirating inventions. 37 ' The purpose of this doctrine was to broaden the
scope of the patent claims.37 9 Patentees rarely plan to rely on protection outside
the literal scope of the claims."8 That reliance usually only arises after the
invention has had commercial success, and imitators attempt to reap the benefit
by narrowly skirting the claims of the patent.381 This doctrine attempts to align
the precise balance between imitation and creativity. 82 The interests in this case
reflect how a judge-made law shifts the balance between innovation and
competition.383
By deciding that the rules of rebuttal are limited to three categories where the
evidence must be found in the prosecution history, the majority reduced the
protection afforded to inventors against copyists."' Judge Newman emphasized
that finding evidence to rebut the presumption in the prosecution history is a
virtual impossibility because all three classes of rebuttal raise questions of fact that
175 Faro III, 344 F.3d at 1367.
376 Id at 1377 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Yn id
379 i
39 Id at 1377-78. The doctrine of equivalents is supposed to make the claims less certain. The
uncertainty is exchanged for the appropriate incentives to invent Id at 1378.
m Faro I, 344 F.3d at 1379.
381 Id
Id
383 Id
3" 14 at 1385.
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require a full exploration of the issues.38 In conclusion, Judge Newman pointed
out that the majority's determination reduces the incentive value of patents."'
C. FINDING THE FOREST AMONG THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS AND
PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL
'The most important thing is to keep the most important thing the most
important thing.
The Patent Clause of the United States Constitution specifically gives
Congress the power to promote the progress of science by granting inventors a
limited monopoly in exchange for their discoveries. 38  During its advent, this
provision of the Constitution was impacted by the fears of piracy and the
inequitable patent policy in England.8 9 The language of the Patent Clause was
also influenced by the economic, deontological, and utilitarian justifications for
the system. In this regard, the doctrine of equivalents and the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel ought to reflect the same intentions as the
justifications from which they stem.
When the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is limited to amendments
that clearly concede the breadth of a claim, the interaction of the doctrine of
equivalents and the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel uphold the
underlying justifications for patent protection. Furthermore, as long as the
doctrine of equivalents is confined to the equivalents of elements, the doctrine
enables the intentions of the Constitution to remain true. In order for the
doctrine of equivalents to function properly, it must be free from the formalistic
constraints imposed by the Federal Circuit in Festo III. The doctrine of
ms Feto II, 344 F.3d at 1385.
386 Id
3" DONALD P. CODuTo, FOUNDATION DESIGN PRINCIPLES AND PPAcncEs 142(1994). Here,
the most important thing is the history that gave birth to the language in the Constitution.
3" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8.
' Graham v. John Deere of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1,5-6,148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 463 (1966).
110 Ferto I1, 344 F.3d at 1365. See Irah H. Donner, Festo is Back! On Remand the Federal Ciradt
Answers FourMore.Questions?, 86J. PAT. & TRADEMARtK OFF. Soc'Y 89,99-100 (2004). The Federal
Circuit has clouded the determination of an individual's patent rights. The Federal Circuit has put
heavy constraints on the doctrine of equivalents by increasing the formalistic traps of the doctrine
of prosecution history estoppel. These constraints have produced more questions than answers.
One issue that his most recent en banc decision raises is what test is to be
applied to determine whether the Festo [II1] presumption can be rebutted. It is
whether the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim
that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalents, or are there three
separate tests-unforseability, tangential, and other reasons?
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prosecution history estoppel works to keep the doctrine of equivalents from being
abused. When implemented properly, the doctrine of prosecution history
estoppel also helps to uphold the justifications for a patent system and balance the
underlying economic policy with the inventor's rights to the invention. When
confined by the formalistic expansive arms of the doctrine of prosecution history
estoppel, however, the doctrine of equivalents is unable to adequately uphold
societal benefits, economic benefits, and the rights of a patent holder.
When the doctrine of prosecution history estoppelis confined to amendments
that clearly forfeit subject matter, it provides an incentive to invent. As stated in
Graver Tank and Warner-Jenkinnson, the doctrine of equivalents gives inventors a
slightly expanded meaning to the words they use in patent claims. From a
deontological standpoint, the inventor is given a slightly larger monopoly for the
disclosure of the invention. This expanded meaning gives the inventor
confidence that competitors who merely change an insignificant word in the
patent claim will not be able to pirate the invention."9 ' This piracy was one of the
main concerns with adopting England's patent system. 92 The American system
was structured so that inventors have confidence in the system, thereby making
them more prone to invent and disclose under the system. 93 This, in turn,
provides a utilitarian benefit by injecting new or improved products into
society.'"
If the two doctrines did not mingle in this fashion, they would give
competitors an incentive to pirate, and the inventor's property right in his
invention would be reduced. As a result, the utilitarian aspects of the patent
system would be reduced because inventors would be more prone to conceal
Should the fundamental test be whether the patentee could reasonably be
expected to have drafted a claim that literally covered the now-accused device,
and the three criteria merely used as factors in determining whether the
fundamental test has been met?
According to the Majority's description of the interplay between the Warner-
Jenkiuon and Fesro [II1] presumptions, if the Warntr-Jenkinton presumption
applies, a patentee will not be able to rebut the Festo [III] presumption under the
tangential or other reason criterion. Further, the Federal Circuit limited
forseeability at the time of the amendment. However, in view of Festo's
argument that new matter issues may prevent some claim amendments from
being foreseeable, should the test only be at the time of the amendment? The
Supreme Court already indicated that the time of filing the application is a
possibility which was rejected by the Federal Circuit. What about at the time of
the invention?
Id
3 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
9 See generally Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-6.
391 CHISUM EI AL, supra note 2, at 54-55.
39 BENTHAM, supra note 13, § 7 p. 13.
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discoveries and not release them to society. As the Supreme Court correctly
pointed out in Festo II, prosecution history estoppel should not act as a complete
bar of equivalents but only a bar of the material the inventor conceded.39 s For
this reason, courts ought to consider all factors and evidence surrounding an
amendment to a claim. The courts should even consider whether other language
was added to circumvent the prior art.
Reducing the court's formalistic expansion of prosecution history estoppel
also gives the inventor an incentive to disclose under a utilitarian theory. 96 When
the inventor files the initial patent application, the inventor is given the
equivalents of all the matter in the patent application. These equivalents remain
until the inventor makes an amendment or argument that concedes the subject
matter. If that amendment or argument is made, the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel takes over, and the inventor's rights to equivalents may be
trumped by notice policy. In that situation, the inventor is held to the literal
meaning of the word. Therefore, in the ideal situation, the inventor wants to
obtain patent protection on the invention without amending the claims of the
invention (this is rarely ever achieved and in many situations undesirable). The
fear of losing the equivalents of elements gives the inventor an incentive to claim
exactly what the inventor believes to be patentable at the onset. From a utilitarian
standpoint though, the doctrine of equivalents should not be trumped by rigid
formalistic procedural rules. Any evidence that the doctrine of equivalents applies
should be heard by the court. Any other rule would chill inventors from making
the disclosure clear to the public and thereby reduce the benefit to society.
When free of formalistic and rigid requirements, prosecution history estoppel
gives investors an economic incentive to commercialize.3 97 The doctrine of
equivalents gives words an interpretation beyond their literal meaning. Therefore,
the monopoly rights given to those words are more expansive than a literal
meaning of the words.' From an economic standpoint, the existence of these
equivalents makes a patent more valuable to the patent owner and to individuals
who want to invest in the patented technology. Investors can be more confident
that a competitor will not attempt to pirate the technology by changing an
insignificant element of the invention. 9 This, in turn, gives investors an
incentive to invest money in the technology.
Because of the significant impact patents have on the economy, courts ought
to consider all evidence when analyzing whether an element was conceded under
"g Festo 11, 535 U.S. at 732.
"' Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 1028.
m Rich, supra note 42, at 85.
198 Festo II, 535 U.S. at 732.
'" GraverTank, 339 U.S. at 607.
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prosecution history estoppel. By limiting the doctrine of equivalents and
prosecution history estoppel to formalistic rules, competitors are more prone to
find formalistic loopholes in the system and pirate inventions. In this regard, for
purely economic reasons, competitors should not be allowed to pirate an
invention by changing an insignificant term. That rule would reduce the
incentives to the inventor without providing any benefit to the public.
When the expansive arms of the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel are
reduced, the doctrine gives the public an incentive to design around prior
inventions.' This doctrine works to provide the public with a clearer fence line
of what the inventor is claiming. This doctrine not only functions to tell the
public what the inventor has claimed, but more importantly it also gives notice to
clarify what the inventor has not claimed. By knowing what an inventor has not
claimed, the public is given an incentive to utilize this unclaimed matter to design
around and make improvements on prior inventions. From a utilitarian standpoint,
these two doctrines function to assure competitors that they are not treading on
claimed matter while not substantially diminishing the patent rights granted to an
inventor. Yet, the utilitarian justifications for patent protection are substantially
reduced when a competitor can make an insubstantial change and avoid an
inventor's patent. The utilitarian aspect of providing society with an incentive to
design around ought not outweigh the deontological incentives to the inventor.
If the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel did not function in this manner,
it would promote piracy of the inventor's discovery, and the overall incentives to
societywould be diminished. Inventors would refuse to disclose their discoveries,
and society would not have base inventions to improve upon.
In light of the express language in the Patent Clause, the economic and
philosophical justifications of the patent system, and legal precedent, equivalents
should remain unless it is clear that subject matter was conceded to circumvent
the prior art or obtain patentability. In determining whether the applicant has
made such an amendment, all the evidence should be considered, including
evidence that other language was added to circumvent the prior art. The court
should also look at what the prior art teaches to ascertain the meaning and
concessions of an amendment. An applicant should never be estopped from
obtaining equivalents merely because an amendment was made to the claims, and
the reason for the amendment was not set forth in the prosecution history. The
intent of the amendment must always be considered because any other rule would
promote piracy, and preventing that piracy was one of the very reasons motivating
the drafting of America's first patent system."
4w CHISUM ET AL, supra note 2, at 75.
40' Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-6.
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V. CONCLUSION
The justifications forpatent protection have developed from a rich, dense
history.' Recent economic justifications for patent protection take into account
the economic growth of the United States. 3 This economic growth is largely
attributed to the protection of ideas through patent protection.' Moreover,
traditional justifications for patent protection include deontological and utilitarian
theory. Under deontological theory, an inventor has a natural or moral right to
an invention regardless of the social consequences to society.4° s Conversely,
under utilitarian theory, property rights in ideas are necessary for the greatest
benefit to society as a whole. 6
As the United States patent system developed, these justifications for patent
protection were used to fine-tune the system. In its advent, our patent system
had its roots in English patent custom; however, the United States system evolved
from this point because of the abusive practices in England.41 7 As Congress'
Patent Acts developed to support the intent of the Constitution and the
justifications for patent protection, the justifications were used to refine the
United States patent system. In many situations, Congress deviated from these
justifications. The current Patent Act, in contrast, attempts to uphold the intent
of the Constitution and is economically and philosophically justified.
These justifications also have their roots in the various doctrines that have
sprouted from the American patent system. Through the Court's decisions in
Graver Tank, Warner-Jenkinson, and Festo II, the Court has attempted to use the
doctrine of equivalents and the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel to justify
the interpretation of patent claims. The Court uses the doctrine of equivalents to
give inventors the equivalents to the meanings of words used to describe an
invention. Deontologically, this doctrine slightly expands the rights given to the
inventor in exchange for the inventor's disclosure. For utilitarian reasons, the
Court has implemented the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel in order to
preclude inventors from resurrecting subject matter and meanings to words that
were conceded during prosecution. This doctrine gives greater weight to the
literal meaning of words, and therefore, it increases the definiteness of the
inventor's disclosure.
40 Seegeneral4 STOBBS, supra note 2, at 3-4; CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 6-7.
0 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 59 (citations omitted).
SId at 5.
4M Id
4w See Aemeral# ADELMAN Er AL., smpra note 14, at 9-17.
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The courts have used the doctrine of equivalents and the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel as tools to interpret the language of patent claims.
In interpreting language through these two doctrines, however, the courts ought
to consider the history and justifications from which these doctrines stem. As
Oliver Wendell Holmes has stated, "[t]he rational study of law is still to a large
extent the study of history."' By looking at the history surrounding the drafting
of the Patent Clause, it is evident that English patent custom, economics,
utilitarian theory, and deontological theory had a substantial influence on the
drafters' intentions.
These historical justifications evidence the drafters' concern with ensuring that
the inventor had the proper incentives to disclose. In this regard, the courts
ought to consider all factors surrounding an amendment to a claim. The mere
fact that an amendment was made and the reasons not set forth in the
prosecution history should never estop equivalents. The court should consider
all the evidence, including any relevant prior art and concessions in other
amendments. Any confinement of the doctrine of equivalents through
prosecution history estoppel reduces the inventor's incentive to disclose and shifts
the economic balance of the patent system. That confinement puts the "inventor
at the mercy of verbalism and would be subordinating substance to form."'
Notwithstanding the myriad of legal considerations that contribute to the
interpretation of words, perhaps this struggle with literalism is better simplified
by a humbling look at the eighteenth century children's author, Lewis Carroll,
when he addressed the ambiguities of language by simply and concisely stating
that "[t]he question is ... which is to be master [the meaning of the word or the
intentions of the speaker]. 4t0
08 Holmes, supra note 97, at 469.
40 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
4t0 LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE LOOKING-
GLASS 186 (1960). Wars have been fought; lives have been destroyed; and fortunes have been lost
all because of the meaning of words. In this regard, the pen truly is mightier than the sword. In the
case of patent law, hundreds of millions of dollars frequently turn on the meaning of a single word.
To more fully understand the destructive force the question of "who is the master" poses in politics,
note the past controversy surrounding Trent Lott. Senator Lott claims his intentions are master, and
his opponents claim that the literal meanings of his words are master. The truth, like everything else
in this world, is entirely unascertainable, because the truth is skewed by human perception, emotion
and recollection, including Senator Lott's. Society will undoubtedly choose an answer to this
question though, and the choice to this unremitting question will likely determine society's
perception on the integrity and aptitude of a man. Sadly, attorneys are not in the business of ever
admitting that we simply do not know.
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